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Preface 
lIE CIVIL WAR was one of the most important events 
in American history. Although studied intensively for 
more than a century, it continues to fascinate and be-
wilder those who examine its myriad aspects. Even today 
there is no general agreement on why a country that 
prided itself upon its pragmatic politics could find no so-
lution for its problems except a long and bloody fraternal 
war that cost more lives than any conflict in the nation's 
history. When that war came, Kentucky W'l<; truly a bor-
der state with strong attachments both north and south. 
In her anguish over the separation, Kentucky adopted 
a unique policy of neutrality that lasted for several 
months. When she did cast her fate with the Union cause, 
a group of her citizens formed a rival government that 
was admitted into the Confederacy. It is the purpose of 
this brief essay to review the struggle over secession and 
neutrality, to look at the course of the war within the 
commonwealth, and to suggest some of the effects the 
war had on the state and its citizens. 
Two main considerations have established the limits of 
the survey. First, the compact format of the Bicentennial 
Bookshelf necessitates a great deal of generalization and 
surrmation and all too many omissions; it also precludes 
extensive documentation. Second, the subject of the 
survey is "The Civil War in Kentucky," not "Kentucky in 
the Civil War," which is a quite different and much 
broader topic. Only occasionally, therefore, have I ven-
tured outside the boundaries of the commonwealth, 
although that limitation meant that I had to ignore the 
Civil War contributions of tens of thousands of Kentuck-
ix 
ians who fought for the Union or the Confederacy far from 
their native state. 
I have long been interested in the Civil War, and my 
research has extended over many years and into many 
libraries. The collections of the Kentucky Historical 
Society have been of great use, although during the 
preparation of this particular volume an extensive remod-
eling program has rendered them less accessible than in 
years past. I am especially grateful to the staffs of The 
Filson Club, the Louisville Free Public Library, the 
Special 'Collections of the Margaret I. King Library at the 
University of Kentucky, and the Kentucky Library at 
Western Kentucky University. 
1 
A STATE DIVIDED 
A S THE SECTIONAL controversy moved along the path 
that led to secession and civil war, Kentucky occupied 
an extremely difficult position. Her citizens were sorely 
divided in their attitudes toward the problems for which 
the country was unable to find peaceful solutions. The 
public knew of family differences that divided such 
noted clans as the Breckinridges and the Clays; similar 
divisions split less well known families from the Jack-
son Purchase to the eastern mountains. Samuel Mc-
Dowell Starling, a slaveholder from Hopkinsville, op-
posed secession so strongly that he volunteered for 
Union military service although he was past fifty years 
of age; he lost one son in Confederate service and an-
other who died fighting for the Union. Such tragedies 
were repeated many times across the state. 
Slavery was one of the institutions that bound Ken-
tucky to the South. Slaves had been brought into the 
state since the early days of settlement, and in 1860 they 
constituted 19.5 percent of the population. But the per-
centage had been decreasing for several decades, and 
the state had few large slaveholders when measured by 
the standards of the Lower South. Many Kentuckians 
who cherished the Union saw nothing wrong with slav-
ery. 
A profitable trade association also bound Kentucky to 
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the states lying to the south. For many years the major 
outlet for her surplus produce had been the Mississippi 
River and its tributaries. The advent of railroads, how-
ever, created new commercial associations with the 
North that diminished the importance of the river traf-
fic. 
With the famed Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 
1799 Kentucky had given the nation one of its first and 
most important expositions of the states' rights doctrine 
which, carried to its extreme, condoned the secession of 
a state from the Union. Yet her citizens had participated 
proudly in wars against Great Britain and Mexico, and 
most Kentuckians had endorsed the efforts of Henry 
Clay to find solutions to the controversies that threat-
ened the existence of the nation they loved. 
Sentimental ties to Virginia, from which Kentucky 
had been formed in 1792, and to North Carolina and 
Tennessee, each also the ancestral home of many Ken-
tuckians, were strong. Yet these ties were countered by 
a new tug toward the free states, where tens of thou-
sands of Kentucky's children lived by 1860. 
Kentucky was relatively more important in 1860 than 
she has been in the twentieth century. Her population 
then ranked ninth in the nation, and she occupied sev-
enth place in the value of farms and fifth in the value of 
livestock. Her diversified agriculture supplied vast 
quantities of tobacco, corn, wheat, hemp, and flax; and 
the superiority of Bluegrass whiskey was generally rec-
ognized, regardless of other sectional disputes. Manu-
facturing lagged well behind agriculture in the state's 
economy, but in 1860 Kentucky ranked fifteenth in both 
capital invested in manufacturing and the annual value 
of products; she was thirteenth in the cost of raw mate-
rials used in her industries. l 
The state's geographical location was of great strategic 
importance. Her accession to the South would give the 
Confederacy a defensible river boundary and one along 
which Confederate armies would pose the threat of a 
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drive to the Great Lakes that could split the Union. No 
one recognized this significance of the commonwealth 
more clearly than Abraham Lincoln. "I think to lose 
Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game," 
he wrote a friend in September 1861. "Kentucky gone, 
we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. 
These all against us, and the job on our hands is too 
large for us. We would as well consent to separation at 
once, including the surrender of the capital." 2 
The nation had been moving toward the hour of crisis 
for many years. The Compromise of 1850, which Ken-
tucky's Henry Clay helped formulate, had failed to re-
solve the sectional differences. Indeed, the struggle had 
intensified after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
in 1854 and the birth of the Republican party, which 
had no southern wing to help force a moderate course 
upon it. While the sectional struggle had many facets, 
the focal point had come to be the future of slavery in 
the territories. A variety of observers agreed that slavery 
had to be able to expand or it would ultimately die, 
much like a grass fire that burns itself out when pre-
vented from spreading. Both friends and foes of slavery 
fought to control the future of the institution in such 
areas as Kansas, where a small-scale civil war preceded 
the greater conflict. The Supreme Court's effort to solve 
the issue in the Dred Scott decision of 1857 had failed. 
Antislavery forces would not accept as final the Court's 
pros lavery stance, and the defenders of slavery were 
even less inclined to accept compromise after the Court 
had endorsed their contentions. 
The political problems that beset Kentucky were com-
plicated during the 1850s by the dissolution of the Whig 
party, which had long dominated the state's politics. 
Despite the efforts of such Kentuckians as Cassius M. 
Clay, the new Republican party made little progress 
within the state, although John C. Fremont, the party's 
first presidential candidate, had done surprisingly well 
in the North in the 1856 presidential election. During 
3 
the last years of the decade Kentucky politics were even 
more confused than usual. Some of the old Whigs be-
came reluctant Democrats, a few joined the Republi-
cans, and many voted Native American or Know-
Nothing for a time. As the nation approached the 1860 
election, the two major political groups in the state were 
the Democrats, who had become the majority party, and 
the Constitutionalists, who shared a somewhat pathetic 
hope that repeated reference to the sanctity of the Con-
stitution and the Union would somehow solve the prob-
lems confronting the state and the nation. 
Such hopes were shattered by the events of 1860. 
When the Democratic party split along sectional lines, 
one of the last political bonds holding the hation 
together disappeared. John C. Breckinridge, vice presi-
dent of the United States and one of Kentucky's greatest 
orators, was nominated for the presidency by the South-
em Democrats; Stephen A. Douglas, the "Little Giant" 
of Illinois, became the candidate of the Northern Demo-
crats. Kentuckians found little solace in the nomination 
of Lincoln by the Republicans. He was a native of Ken-
tucky, but his "house divided" speech had alarmed 
many slaveholders who would not accept the curtail-
ment of slavery expansion that he and his party demand-
ed. As the campaign progressed, many Kentuckians 
turned toward John Bell, the Constitutional Union can-
didate from neighboring Tennessee, whose simple plat-
form was the preservation of the Union. 
Bell captured a majority in 35 of Kentucky's 110 coun-
ties in 1860 and won a plurality in 25 more. He was 
strongest in the old Whig strongholds and in the coun-
ties where the largest slaveholders were grouped. 
Breckinridge had a majority in 36 counties but plurali-
ties in only 7; despite his Southern affiliation, he failed 
to carry most of the counties with the heaviest concen-
tration of slaves. Douglas had a majority in only 7 coun-
ties, and Lincoln did not carry a single one. The popular 
vote was 66,051 for Bell, 53,143 for Breckinridge, 25,638 
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for Douglas, and 1,364 for Lincoln. Although Fayette 
County contained a number of Lincoln's in-laws, he re-
ceived just five votes there.3 But Lincoln swept most of 
the northern states, and with just less than 40 percent of 
the popular vote he received a clear majority of the elec-
toral ballots. 
Several weeks before the election George D. Pren-
tice, the editor of the Louisville Daily Journal, had re-
marked hopefully that the public usually quieted down 
after a bitter election. But, he warned, "for the first time 
in the history of our country, this calm after the storm is 
imperilled; we are threatened even now by the angry 
mutterings of an impending storm, which, as some think 
portends-disaster and devastation." The editor had at-
tempted to prevent Lincoln's election, but he was not 
totally dismayed by the result. The Republicans would 
not control either Congress or the courts, and impeach-
ment could be employed if Lincoln exceeded his lawful 
powers. "He could not infringe the Constitution if he 
would," Prentice declared. While he blamed "the igno-
raRCe and fanaticism of the Abolition party" for the cri-
sis, Prentice denied that the Republicans were the abo-
lition party.4 
Many Southerners, including numerous Kentuckians, 
did not agree with Prentice. The election of a sectional 
president by a sectional party committed to halting the 
expansion of slavery was, to them, a call for action. Per-
haps the incoming administration could not harm the 
South at that moment, but why should sovereign states 
wait until they were injured before defending them-
selves? The states' rights doctrine, expressed in the 
Kentucky Resolutions and honed into precision by such 
great Southern leaders as the late John C. Calhoun, as-
serted that a state could, if need be, protect itself against 
the tyranny of the majority by withdrawing from the 
Union. Such a move would not constitute rebellion or 
insurrection; it was the exercise of a basic constitutional 
right. The federal government, the agent of the states, 
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had no right to prevent a state from following such a 
course of action. 
Led by South Carolina, whose convention approved 
secession unanimously on December 20, 1860, the 
states of the Lower South began the process that led to 
the formation of the Confederate States of America. 
Some advocates of secession did not view it as a step 
toward a permanent separation. "We can make better 
terms out of the Union than in it," predicted Thomas R. 
R. Cobb of Georgia, and some Kentuckians agreed with 
him. Obviously, the more extensive the secession move-
ment, the more pressure it would place on the federal 
government to make sweeping concessions. But eight of 
the fifteen slave states held back from the first wave of 
secession, and Kentucky was one of that number. 
"No one believes that Kentucky as a state is for dis-
union or secession," Charles A. Wickliffe insisted to a 
friend only days after Lincoln's election. Wickliffe 
wanted "a grand Mass Convention of all Kentuckians 
opposed to the present division movement. . . to pro-
claim to the Country that Kentucky will stand by the 
Union, or perish with it." 5 His sentiments were echoed 
at numerous town and county meetings and in the edito-
rial columns of much of the state's press. On December 
18 Senator John J. Crittenden, Clay's successor in the 
role of compromiser, revealed a detailed, comprehen-
sive plan designed to resolve the crisis, and Kentucky 
participated anxiously, hopefully, and unsuccessfully in 
this and other efforts at compromise. All of them col-
lapsed on the issue of the expansion of slavery. 
Beriah Magoffin, the Democrat who had been elected 
governor in 1859, bore much of the burden of trying to 
chart the course of the state during the crisis. He was a 
finn defender of slavery, "I do not believe slavery to be 
wrong," he had told the legislature; "I do not believe it 
to be a moral, social, or political evil." He also sup-
ported the right of secession, and he was convinced that 
Southern rights had been violated. But he was opposed 
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to immediate secession, and in an effort to prevent it he 
sent a circular letter to the other slave-state governors 
on December 9, 1860. The minimum demands of the 
South, he suggested, should include strict enforcement 
of the fugitive slave act, the division of the common ter-
ritories at the 37th parallel, a perpetual guarantee of the 
free use of the Mississippi River, and some sort of 
Southern veto in the Senate over slavery legislation. 
These rights could be secured, the governor declared, 
by holding first a conference of all the slave states, fol-
lowed by a full conference of all the states in the 
Union.6 
Before the end of the month the governor restated his 
position in response to a plea from Alabama that Ken-
tucky, "who so gallantly vindicated the sovereignty of 
the States in 1798," join the secession movement al-
ready under way. Kentucky shared the South's outrage 
over the injustices committed by the North, Magoffin 
replied, but he favored, instead of secession, a confer-
ence of slave states to formulate united demands to the 
North. "You have no hope of a redress in the Union," 
the governor wrote. "We yet look hopefully to assur-
ances that a powerful reaction is going on at the 
North." 7 
On December 27 the governor called a special session 
of the legislature to consider the situation confronting 
the commonwealth. It was already too late for the 
Southern conference he had sought, Magoffin told the 
legislators; Kentucky should therefore hold her own 
convention to decide upon her own course of action. 
Meanwhile, in a last effort "to save the old ship" from 
wrecking "upon the rocks of disunion," Kentucky 
should participate in the conference of border states 
scheduled for early February. The Frankfort Tri-Weekly 
Commonwealth examined Magoffin's request for a con-
vention and concluded that "the Governor of Kentucky 
is a secessionist," a sentiment shared by many of his 
constituents.8 The legislature rejected Magoffin's pro-
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posed convention, but it sent six delegates to the futile 
Peace Conference that convened in Washington on Feb-
ruary 4, and it asked Congress to call a national conven-
tion to consider amendments such as those Crittenden 
had proposed. 
The legislature adjourned from February 11 until 
March 20. When it reconvened, the members called for 
a border state convention to meet in Frankfort on May 
27. It also ratified a proposed thirteenth amendment to 
the Constitution that would have guaranteed slavery in 
the states where it was legal. The session ended in early 
April, a week before the Civil War opened with the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter. 
As the war started, many Kentuckians shared both 
Magoffin's opposition to secession and his conviction 
that the Union should not be held together by force. 
When Kentucky was asked to supply four regiments as 
its quota of the 75,000 volunteers called for by the presi-
dent, Magoffin refused to cooperate: "I say, emphatic-
ally, Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked pur-
pose of subduing her sister Southern States." 9 But 
Kentucky also refused to join the second wave of seces-
sion that carried North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and Arkansas out of the Union and into the Confed-
eracy. Some extreme Southern Rightists demanded im-
mediate secession, and some extreme Unionists wanted 
to help stamp out rebellion, but the majority of Ken-
tuckians favored the unusual policy of neutrality that 
was finally adopted. The revered Crittenden spoke for 
the mass of his constituents when he declared on April 
17 that Kentucky's proper role was that of a mediator be-
tween the two hostile forces, and on April 30 he wrote a 
son: "Kentucky has not seceded, and I believe never 
will. She loves the Union and will cling to it as long as 
possible. And so, I hope, will you.. . . God knows what 
is to be the end." 10 Unionist meetings, composed 
largely of Bell and Douglas supporters of 1860, en-
dorsed a neutral role while condemning both secession 
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and coercion. Prentice expressed their hopes in the 
March 20 issue of his Journal when he proclaimed: 
"KENTUCKIANS! YOU CONSTITUTE TODAY THE FORLORN 
HOPE OF THE UNION." 
While Magoffin's sympathies were with the Confeder-
acy, he feared a Union invasion if Kentucky should 
move in that direction, and many of his fellow citizens 
were opposed to secession. A convention during the 
secession excitement might have succeeded in sweep-
ing Kentucky out of the Union, but the Southern Right-
ists were unable to secure the call. Lincoln sensed the 
delicacy of the situation and, without relinquishing any 
principle of Unionism, let it be known that he would 
not, for the time being, challenge the state's neutrality. 
On May 16 by a vote of 69-29 the Kentucky House of 
Representatives resolved: "That this state and the citi-
zens thereof shall take no part in the Civil War now 
being waged, except as mediators and friends to the bel-
ligerent parties; and that Kentucky should, during the 
contest, occupy a position of strict neutrality." The Sen-
ate later adopted a somewhat similar resolution, and the 
governor proclaimed the state's neutrality on May 20. A 
bewildered observer from abroad might well have con-
cluded that the United States had become three coun-
tries: the Union, the Confederacy, and Kentucky. 
Few Kentuckians with political acumen could have 
expected neutrality to continue permanently. The vital 
questions were: When would it end? And in what direc-
tion would the commonwealth move next? While both 
factions made every effort to influence the final deci-
sion, for several months the state's unique status con-
tinued in precarious balance. But volunteers slipped 
away to join the armies that were being raised, and 
some covert recruiting occurred within the state. In an 
unusual effort to find some solution, the Unionists se-
lected Crittenden, Archibald Dixon, and S. S. Nicholas 
to treat with Magoffin, John C. Breckinridge, and Rich-
ard Hawes, the spokesmen for the Southern Rightists. 
9 
The sextet agreed to continue neutrality and to make 
provisions for the state's defense, but their cooperation 
broke down when the Unionists refused to accept the 
governor as a member of a special five-man board that 
would be in charge of the state's military preparedness. 
When the legislature finally established such a board 
on May 24, it was given the supervisory military func-
tions lodged in the governor by the state's constitution. 
During the period of strained neutrality each faction 
organized its own military force. Inspector General 
Simon B. Buckner's State Guards were largely Confed-
erate in sentiment; the new Home Guards were over-
whelmingly Unionist. Both forces engaged in a feverish 
search for weapons and in sporadic drilling. Naval Lieu-
tenant William "Bull" Nelson, whose vast bulk made 
him one of the most improbable undercover agents of 
the war, was instrumental in shipping 5,000 "Lincoln 
guns" into the state, where staunch Union men con-
nived in their distribution. James M. Shackleford of 
Richmond, for example, wrote Nelson to see "whether 
we can get 100 Enfield or Sharps rifles, we are organiz-
ing two Companies of everlasting Union men, in our 
town and county and want this description of arms for 
one of them." 11 The Southern Rightists were equally 
guilty in intent but less successful in securing weapons. 
Several times clashes were narrowly avoided, and there 
was grave danger that a chance encounter would touch 
off civil war within the state. But General Buckner 
negotiated agreements in June with Union General 
George B. McClellan and Governor Isham Harris of 
Tennessee whereby both agreed to respect the state's 
neutrality, and, somehow, the fragile policy survived 
through the humid months of a Kentucky summer. 
Two elections held during the summer of 1861 indi-
cated the relative strength of the two groups and fore-
shadowed the commonwealth's ultimate decision. The 
Unionists, spurred on by the efforts of such radicals as 
Joseph Holt, made strenuous efforts to sweep the con-
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gressional election of June 20. Especially effective 
against the Southern Rightists were their charges that 
the Confederacy would destroy the lucrative market for 
Kentucky's surplus slaves by reopening the foreign 
slave trade and that the South "only wants Kentucky to 
stand between her & danger, to be her battleground." 12 
Recognizing that defeat was certain, many Southern 
Rightists boycotted the election. The total vote was just 
. over half the 1860 canvass, and the Unionists won nine 
of ten seats. The Southern Rightists carried only the 
First District in the extreme western end of the state, as 
the Unionists achieved a 54,700 majority in the 125,000 
ballots cast. 
The Unionists won another decisive political battle 
on August 5, when state legislators were elected. Earlier 
in the year confident Southern Rightists had expected to 
win control of the legislature, after which they would 
order a convention that would pass the ordinance of 
secession. But their prospects had dimmed, and again 
many Southern advocates stayed away from the polls. 
The new legislature had a 76-24 Unionist majority in 
the house and a 27-11 margin in the senate, although 
only half the senate seats had been up for election. 
These figures may not have been an accurate gauge of 
public sentiment, but they provided margins sufficient 
to override gubernatorial vetoes. The tide was flowing 
toward the Union, and the neutrality policy was soon 
subjected to increased strains. 
Much of the Union recruiting of Kentuckians had 
been carried on from camps just north of the Ohio River, 
although Nelson had been active in the Crab Orchard 
area since early July. As soon as the results of the 
August election were known, he established Camp Dick 
Robinson in Garrard County, to the dismay of many 
moderate Unionists who continued to view neutrality as 
the best policy for the commonwealth. When Crittenden 
voiced such discontent, Nelson replied blandly, "That a 
camp of loyal Union men, native Kentuckians, should 
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assemble in camp under the flag of the Union and upon 
their native soil [and] should be a cause of apprehen-
sion is something I do not clearly understand." Magof-
fin received a similar rebuff when he protested the 
breach of neutrality to President Lincoln. The presi-
dent, pointing out the governor's failure to "entertain 
any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union," 
refused to close the camp and to halt enlistments. "Tak-
ing all the means within my reach to form a judgment," 
Lincoln wrote, "I do not believe it is the popular wish 
of Kentucky that this force shall be removed beyond her 
limits; and, with this impression, I must respectfully 
decline to so remove it." 13 Confederate authorities 
were more circumspect in their activities, but they were 
in contact with Kentucky officials and citizens sympa-
thetic to their cause, and Camp Boone, just inside the 
Tennessee border a few miles south of Guthrie, re-
ceived a steady stream of Kentucky volunteers. 
By late August the Confederate supporters had be-
come the state's strongest advocates of continued neu-
trality. The secessionist movement no longer had any 
prospect of success, and if Kentucky relinquished her 
neutrality, it would be to join the Union. Incidents be-
came more frequent and bitter, but an open rupture 
was avoided until early September, when the decisive 
event occurred in the western end of the state. Both 
sides recognized the strategic importance of controlling 
the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers; 
and such river ports as Columbus, Paducah, and Smith-
land assumed unwonted importance. The impetuous 
Confederate General Gideon Pillow had wanted to 
seize Columbus as early as May, but he had been dis-
suaded by Buckner. In early September, General Leo-
nidas Polk, the Episcopal bishop who held the com-
mand in western Tennessee, became convinced that 
Federal troops were poised to make the move and or-
dered Pillow to occupy Columbus. Pillow did so on 
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September 4, and Union forces commanded by Ulysses 
S. Grant then seized Paducah. 
Governor Magoffin denounced both sides for "equally 
palpable and open violations of the neutral rights of 
Kentucky," and he demanded that all military forces be 
withdrawn at once. But the Unionist majorities in the 
legislature rejected a resolution to that effect; instead, 
they demanded a unilateral Confederate withdrawal. 
When the governor vetoed their resolution, he was over-
ridden by 68-26 and 25-9 margins in the house and sen-
ate.14 Desperate last-minute efforts to restore Ken-
tucky's neutrality failed, and the state at last found itself 
at its Rubicon. The delay had been of value, for it had 
allowed time for the dominant opinion to organize and 
make itself heard. As the Civil War came to Kentucky in 
the late summer of 1861, there was no doubt but that the 
prevailing sentiment in the state was Unionist. 
2 
THE WAR BEGINS 
WITH THE END of Kentucky's neutrality, Union and 
Confederate troops poured into the state as each .side 
sought to control as much territory as possible. On Sep-
tember 18 the legislature called for the expulsion of the 
Confederates and gave command of the state volunteers 
to General Robert Anderson, the Kentuckian who had 
won fame by his defense of Fort Sumter. Thomas L. 
Crittenden was put in charge of the reorganized State 
Guard, Buckner having refused a Union commission. 
Anderson established his headquarters in Louisville, 
through which troops and supplies were pouring for the 
state's defense. Never in good health after his South 
Carolina ordeal, Anderson relinquished command on 
October 8 to General William T. Sherman. George H. 
Thomas, a Virginian who had refused to follow his state 
into secession, commanded at Camp Dick Robinson, 
while Nelson, having made a quick switch from naval 
lieutenant to army brigadier general, opened Camp 
Kenton near Maysville. In the western end of the state 
Grant commanded the forces that had seized Smithland 
and Paducah. 
Sherman soon found himself in difficulties with his 
superiors when he took a realistic view of what would 
be required to win the war. He was disappointed by the 
reaction of Kentuckians, who had been expected to 
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sweep away all traces of secession and provide a major 
increment to the Union's war effort. To the contrary, 
Sherman complained, "the Kentuckians, instead of as-
sisting, call from every quarter for protection against 
local secessionists." Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, 
after conferring with Sherman in Louisville on October 
16, reported Sherman's complaint that "the young men 
were generally secessionists and had joined the Confed-
erates, while the Union men, the aged and conserva-
tives, would not enroll themselves to engage in conflict 
with their relations on the other side." 1 Competing 
Union and state authorities had authorized the raising of 
too many units; would-be officers abounded, but too few 
recruits were content to serve in the ranks. By the end 
of 1861 some 29,203 Kentuckians had been accepted 
into Union service; 42,000 had been sought. 
Military equipment was in such short supply that 
many of the new troops could not even be armed with 
rifles. Sherman had no defense line for his scattered for-
ces, and he was convinced that they were in imminent 
danger of being overwhelmed by massive Confederate 
armies. He needed 200,000 men, he declared, a figure 
that caused his superiors to question both his judgment 
and his nerve. Secretary of War Simon Cameron tele-
graphed President Lincoln from Louisville in mid-Oc-
tober: "Matters are in a much worse condition than I ex-
pected to find them. A large number of troops needed 
here immediately." 2 But Sherman was held responsible 
for much of the situation, and the following month Don 
Carlos Buell replaced him as commander of the Army of 
the Ohio. 
The Unionists hastened the departure of many Con-
federates from the state. Some Kentuckians had left to 
join the Southern army within days of the fall of Fort 
Sumter, but the Confederacy had not pushed for enlist-
ments, partly because of the acute shortage of equip-
ment and partly because of the state's neutrality. The 
number leaving the state increased after Camp Boone 
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was established, and it spurted after the events of early 
September, despite Union efforts to apprehend sus-
pected Confederate sympathizers. John Hunt Morgan, 
for example, slipped away from Lexington on the night 
of September 20, taking with him members of the elite 
Kentucky Rifles, and Senator Breckinridge, former vice-
president of the United States, eluded capture by flee-
ing to Virginia, where he accepted a commission in the 
Conferate army. Breckinridge would not see his home 
again for nearly eight years, a record matched by few 
other Kentucky Confederates. Such distinguished citi-
zens as ex-Governor Charles S. Morehead and R. T. 
Durrett were seized and shipped to Northern prisons. 
On September lO, 1861, General Albert Sidney John-
ston was placed in command of Confederate Depart-
ment No.2, a military monstrosity that stretched all the 
way from the Appalachian Mountains in the east to the 
Indian Territory in the west. Born in Washington, Ken-
tucky, Johnston had distinguished himself in the armies 
of both the United States and the Republic of Texas. 
During the 1850s he had commanded the famed Second 
U.S. Cavalry in which Robert E. Lee had served as lieu-
tenant colonel. Head of the Department of the Pacific 
when the war started, Johnston resigned his commission 
and made the long, dangerous trip cross-continent to 
Richmond, where he became one of the Confederacy's 
full generals. He enjoyed the complete confidence of 
President Jefferson Davis, who later rejected a demand 
for his removal by declaring, "If Sidney Johnston is not 
a general. . . we have no general." 3 
As soon as Johnston assumed command at Nashville 
he appointed. Buckner brigadier general and ordered 
him to occupy Bowling Green. This advance would 
help straighten the Confederate line and protect the 
rich supplies of northern Tennessee; it might also gain 
both men and supplies from southern Kentucky while 
denying them to the enemy. Buckner entrained on the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad on September 17 and 
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reached Bowling Green the next morning with a 
vanguard of some 1,300 men. The anticipated arrival of 
the Confederates had already created consternation 
among the town's Union population. "Some of the 
members have sold out and gone," a local woman wrote. 
"And they have been moving the women and children 
out of town all the week and some of them are almost 
frightened to death. . . . It seems evident that Bow ling 
Green is a doomed city." A Confederate officer, sur-
prised at the extent of Unionist support in the southern 
part of the state, reported, "One old woman met us with 
a Bible in her hand, said she was prepared to die." 4 
Most of the troops in the Bow ling Green area camped 
along the Barren River, where wood and water were 
plentiful. In addition to holding intensive drill sessions, 
they labored on massive fortifications designed to foil 
the anticipated Federal assault. A Union officer who 
inspected the Confederate works in February 1862 after 
the evacuation of Bowling Green could hardly believe 
that "the Southern army could have completed such 
vast works. The labor has been immense-their troops 
cannot be well drilled-their time must have been 
chiefly spent in hard work, with the axe and spade." 5 
The arrival of General Johnston in late October indi-
cated the importance he attached to the position. By 
January 1862 he had only 48,000 men to defend a front 
that stretched nearly 400 miles across the southern por-
tion of the state. His major concentrations were at Cum-
berland Gap, Bowling Green, Forts Henry and Donel-
son in Tennessee, and Columbus. The department was 
also short of most supplies and equipment, and John-
ston spent much of his time appealing to state and Con-
federate officials for additional help. Like his Union 
counterpart, Johnston was initially disappointed by the 
number of Kentucky volunteers. "There are thousands 
of ardent friends to the South in the state," he wrote 
Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin, "but there is ap-
parently among them no concert of action." 6 When the 
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number of volunteers increased to a more satisfactory 
figure, General Johnston was embarrassed by his inabil-
ity to equip them. 
Each army in Kentucky grossly overestimated the 
strength of the other, and each worked frantically to 
prepare for an attack by its supposedly more numerous 
foe. A great deal of activity occurred during the last 
months of 1861, particularly along the Green River. 
Both Union and Confederate recruits received some 
badly needed field experience in marches and forays 
calculated to gain intelligence about the enemy and to 
deny him any knowledge of what his opponent was 
doing. Camp rumors foretold a major battle along the 
Green River, but the rain-drenched autumn passed 
without the predicted clash. Yet the war gradually be-
came more real, for civilians as well as for the new sol-
diers, some of whom were already regretting their 
eagerness to enlist. The romance of war meant little to 
Mary H. Wallace when she stood by the road and 
watched a Confederate column tramp by on its way to 
Hopkinsville. "I saw Brother pass by without being able 
even to shake hands & when he disappeared amid the 
dust noise & confusion of sounds attendant on a march I 
felt as if I would never see him again. I put my face 
down on the gate & cried with all my heart." 7 
The first shot of the Civil War in Kentucky was re-
ported fired in at least a dozen different places, but the 
few engagements that occurred in late 1861 were on a 
scale that would appear insignificant when measured 
against later conflicts. Among the few skirmishes of con-
sequence was the October 21 action in the Rockcastle 
Hills in the southeastern part of the state. General Felix 
Zollicoffer, attempting to thrust beyond London into 
central Kentucky, was checked by a well-fortified Union 
force under the command of Brigadier General Albin 
Schoepf. Combined casualties were probably under 
100; but when Zollicoffer withdrew, Unionist boasts 
escalated the affair into a major victory. Another Union 
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force encountered Nathan B. Forrest, an untutored mili-
tary genius, at Sacramento on December 28, and the 
survivors contributed to the building of the Forrest 
legend. More than a score of other Kentucky communi-
ties also experienced their first taste of the war during 
the closing months of 186l. 
While the armies sought inconclusively for an advan-
tage, the Confederates in southern Kentucky moved to 
establish the proper constitutional relationship with the 
Confederate States of America. Aware that the Frankfort 
government was hopelessly Unionist, such Confederate 
leaders as George W. Johnson of Scott County and Gen-
eral John C. Breckinridge decided to establish a govern-
ment that would reflect their views. A preliminary meet-
ing held in Russellville on October 29-30 condemned 
the Frankfort legislature for its many crimes and ap-
pealed to the fundamental right of the people "to alter, 
reform, or abolish their government, in such manner as 
they think proper." Assuming that Governor Magoffin 
could not provide for a meeting of the legislature free 
from the intimidation of Federal troops, the secessionist 
representatives from 32 counties established a commit-
tee to arrange for a sovereignty convention. 
Some 115 delegates from 68 counties assembled in 
Russellville on November 18, but many were soldiers or 
civilians who had fled to the protection of the army at 
Bowling Green. They were somewhat embarrassed by 
having to violate a portion of the cherished doctrine of 
states' rights, but the state legislature would hardly call 
the special convention that could pass an ordinance of 
secession. So the convention, presided over by Henry 
C. Burnett of Trigg County, appealed to "the ultimate 
right of revolution possessed by all mankind against 
perfidious and despotic government" for justification of 
its actions. Since "the President and Congress have 
treated this supreme. law of the Union with contempt, 
and usurped to themselves the right to interfere with 
the rights and liberties of the States and the people," 
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the delegates solemnly affirmed, " ... we do hereby 
forever sever our connection with the Government of 
the United States, and, in the name of the people, we do 
here by declare Kentucky to be a free and independent 
State, clothed with all the power to fix her own destiny 
and to secure her own rights and liberties. . . ." Since 
the state government was "unworthy of the support of a 
brave and free people," they asserted, ". . . the people 
are thereby absolved from all allegiance to said govern-
ment, and. . . they have a right to establish any govern-
ment which to them may seem best adapted to the pres-
ervation of their rights and liberties." 8 
The political vacuum thus created had to be filled, 
and provision was made for the assembling of a 100-
member convention to provide for "the restoration of a 
permanent government" as soon as an election could be 
conducted "free from the influence of the armies of the 
United States." That date appearing somewhat indefi-
nite, the Russellville delegates established the Provi-
sional Government of Kentucky with power vested in a 
governor and ten councilmen, one from each congres-
sional district, all elected by the convention itself. The 
confused conditions within the state were indicated by 
the provision that "the Constitution and laws of Ken-
tucky, not inconsistent with the acts of this convention, 
and the establishment of this government, and the laws 
which may be enacted by the Governor and Council, 
shall be the laws of this State." Bowling Green was 
designated as the capital, but the governor and council 
were authorized "to meet at any other place that they 
may consider appropriate." In view of future develop-
ments, it was well that such flexibility was provided.9 
George W. Johnson, a successful fifty-year-old planter, 
accepted the governorship. A genial character noted for 
his lavish hospitality, Johnson had based his seces-
sionist beliefs upon a firm Jeffersonian foundation. Op-
posed to the war, he had supported secession in the 
quixotic hope that Kentucky's accession to the Confed-
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eracy would create a balance of power that would end 
the war. Under threat of arrest he had escaped to the 
Confederate lines in September, but both his age and a 
withered arm appeared to preclude military service. 
Few of the delegates who adjourned on November 20 
intended for Kentucky to retain the independent status 
in which they had placed her. Section 8 of the tempo-
rary "constitution" provided for the negotiation of "a 
treaty with the Confederate States of America, by which 
the state of Kentucky" might be "admitted as one of said 
Confederate States, upon an equal footing in all respects 
with the other States of said Confederacy," and Section 
9 provided for the appointment of three commissioners 
to conduct the negotiations. For this mission the con-
vention selected William Preston of Fayette County, 
William C. Simms of Bourbon County, and Burnett. 
Simms and Burnett left almost immediately for Rich-
mond, carrying with them credentials and a lengthy let-
ter to President Davis in which Governor Johnson at-
tempted to justifY the unorthodox recourse to 
revolution. Asserting the desire of the great majority of 
Kentuckians to join the Confederacy, Johnson asked the 
president to "throw around this provisional government, 
in its infancy, the protection of the Confederate States of 
America." Davis recommended Kentucky's admission to 
the Confederate Provisional Congress on December 4, 
despite his misgivings about the irregular process the 
state had followed. While a few members of Congress 
echoed his concern, the vote on December 10 to admit 
Kentucky was unanimous. Ten members were soon 
elected to the Provisional Congress, and that body ap-
propriated an initial $1,000,000 to help support Ken-
tucky's troops. 
The Confederate state government established itself 
in Bowling Green with the friendly cooperation of Gen-
eral Johnston. The governor and his colleagues la-
bored diligently to create a viable government, but they 
had little success in the few months before they had to 
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leave the state. Their jurisdiction hardly extended 
beyond the Confederate lines, and they were notably 
unsuccessful in collecting taxes. They had better suc-
cess in raising the twenty companies of troops autho-
rized by an act of December 23, but even the Confeder-
ate government recognized how little effective power 
Confederate Kentucky possessed. Secretary Benjamin 
informed the governor on February 3, 1862 that Ken-
tucky's quota of soldiers would be 46,000 men. But, 
Benjamin added, "under the peculiar circumstances in 
which Kentucky is placed and the difficulties which em-
barrass her authorities I cannot hope that you will be 
able at present to meet this call.. . ." 10 The Confeder-
ate treasury had to be tapped for additional sums to help 
maintain the new government. 
While the Confederate government was being es-
tablished, the military stalemate began to resolve itself. 
The first important moves. began in the southeastern 
region of rugged mountains, heavy timber, and swift 
streams where the Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia 
boundaries converge. If the Union troops controlled that 
area, they would threaten the vital Virginia-Tennessee 
railroad connection and would be within striking dis-
tance of the Unionists in eastern Tennessee. If the Con-
federates controlled it, they might be able to thrust from 
there into the Bluegrass or even move against Cincin-
nati. In spite of the region's great strategic importance, 
both Johnston and Buell assigned it low priority. They 
saw the Louisville-Bowling Green-Nashville corridor 
as the most important sector, and the local commanders 
in the east were left to operate almost independently. 
General Zollicoffer, a Tennessee journalist and politi-
cian, had been ordered into eastern Tennessee on July 
26, 1861, to "preserve peace, protect the railroad, and 
repel invasion." He had a good sense of strategy and he 
was temperamentally inclined to take the offensive, so 
that when Kentucky's neutrality ended he moved 
quickly to occupy such vital points as Cumberland Gap. 
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He longed to demonstrate his military talents by seizing 
the Bluegrass, but his 7,000 troops were poorly trained 
and equipped, and the country in front of him was in-
capable of supporting even his modest force. While he 
sought to acquire more resources, Zollicoffer tried to 
keep the enemy off balance by a series of feints and 
minor actions such as the attack at Rockcastle Hills. 
George H. Thomas became Zollicoffer's opponent on 
September 15, when he assumed command of the Fed-
eral forces centered at Camp Dick Robinson. Thomas 
also Fecognized the importance of the Cumberland Gap 
region, but he, too, faced problems of inadequate sup-
plies, green troops, and poor transportation facilities. He 
felt neglected by Buell, but his army was gradually built 
up to some 20,000 men, and supplies, if not abundant, at 
least appeared in more adequate quantities. Thomas be-
came famous during the war for his slow, deliberate 
preparations, but as the year neared its end he appeared 
ready to make a move. 
Before the end of October, Zollicoffer had become 
convinced that the Union advance would be directed to 
the west of Cumberland Gap, somewhere in the long in-
terval between that point and Johnston's main force at 
Bowling Green. The Albany, Kentucky-Jamestown, 
Tennessee turnpike, one of the best roads in the entire 
region, appeared to be the most feasible route. To 
counter this anticipated move, Zollicoffer began in No-
vember to shift his troops westward, leaving behind 
small detachments in strong defensive positions to hold 
the mountain passes. He arrived at Mill Springs, a small 
village on the south bank of the Cumberland River, on 
Friday, November 29. His army could be supplied there 
by steamboat from Nashville, and foraging was better 
than in the country he had left. His army had dwindled 
to only 4,000 men, and, as Zollicoffer warned Johnston, 
1,000 of them were without weapons and many of the 
others carried ancient flintlock muskets or shotguns. 
Since identical shortages existed throughout Johnston's 
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command, he could do little to remedy Zollicoffer's situ-
ation. 
Given more favorable conditions, Zollicoffer hoped to 
advance against Danville or London. Meanwhile, to as-
sist in his probing reconnaissance and to facilitate a 
rapid movement against the Federal forces, he moved to 
the north side of the Cumberland, despite the danger of 
being confronted by a larger enemy army while a river 
subject to sudden floods cut across his line of retreat. 
Expected reinforcements were detained in Tennessee, 
supplies continued to be inadequate, and General John-
ston provided little guidance for the developing crisis 
on his right flank. President Davis complicated the situ-
ation by appointing George B. Crittenden, a son of the 
senator, to command and relegating Zollicoffer to head 
the army's First Brigade. 
By January 1862, when Crittenden arrived to assume 
command, Thomas's army had become so much stronger 
that the best chance of success for the Confederates lay 
in holding their defensive positions until Thomas came 
to them. Crittenden was disturbed that Zollicoffer had 
not pulled the Confederate troops back across the Cum-
berland River to its south bank. But he agreed that with 
the waters almost at flood stage, the withdrawal would 
have to be postponed. Little time remained to him, 
however, for the Union army had finally begun its ad-
vance. 
Thomas had wanted to cut the Confederates' supply 
line, perhaps by seizing control of the river at Burkes-
ville, but Buell ordered him to move eastward and con-
centrate with Schoepf near Somerset. The army moved 
slowly over roads no better than quagmires; the infantry 
averaged only five miles a day, and the artillery and 
supply wagons could not keep up with them. By Jan-
uary 17 Thomas was at Logan's Crossroads, still several 
miles from Somerset and some nine or ten miles north 
of the Confederate fortifications. Since his rearguard 
was lagging far behind, Thomas ordered Schoepf to 
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come to him so that they could attempt to carry out 
Buell's order to capture or disperse the Confederate 
force. l1 
Crittenden knew of Thomas's approach, but he 
thought that swollen streams would prevent Schoepf 
from joining Thomas for at least a day or two. Although 
they had only 4,000 effectives, Crittenden proposed to a 
council of war on Saturday evening, January 18, that 
they attack Thomas before he was reinforced. Zollicof-
fer may have objected, but the Confederates started 
their advance soon after midnight. A cold rain began to 
fall, and progress was painfully slow in the wintry dark-
ness. The troops were wet, hungry, and weary when the 
crackle of gunfire signaled contact with the enemy. It 
was then a little short of seven o'clock on Sunday morn-
ing, January 19. 
The Tenth Indiana Infantry and Colonel Speed F. 
Fry's Fourth Kentucky Infantry regiments withstood the 
early Confederate assault until Thomas could get up re-
inforcements. When Confederates fired on his men from 
the shelter of a ravine, Fry became so incensed that he 
climbed a rail fence and "defied them to stand up and 
fight like men." The usual battlefield confusion was 
augmented by a dense pall of rain, smoke, and fog and 
by thick timber and undergrowth that rendered artillery 
almost useless and compounded the commanders' prob-
lems of controlling their troops. During the early-morn-
ing confusion General Zollicoffer rode into the Union 
lines. He thought he was among Confederate units, and 
his raincoat concealed his own identity. "We are firing 
on our own men!" he told Colonel Fry, and the latter 
was giving the order to cease fire when a Confederate 
staff officer galloped up and yelled, "It's the enemy, 
General!" General Zollicoffer was immediately shot out 
of the saddle.12 
Disheartened by the news, some Confederates began 
to drift away from the fighting, but a savage charge by 
the Twentieth Tennessee and Fifteenth Alabama regi-
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ments temporarily stabilized the line. Thomas, per-
sonally directing his units as they went into action, 
checked the Confederates at the rail fence that had been 
Fry's pulpit. The men fought viciously at such close 
range that some seized rifles across the fence and at-
tempted to wrestle them away from their owners. 
Thomas poured in more troops, and he was finally able 
to get some artillery into action. About ten o'clock, some 
three hours after the first shots, the Confederate left was 
broken. Despite heavy casualties, the Mississippi and 
Tennessee regiments that had already fought so gal-
lantly protected the retreat and prevented a disaster. 
Both sides had used about 4,000 men. The Confederate 
losses were reported as 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 95 
missing; the Union casualties were 40 killed, 207 
wounded, and 15 missing. 
Two fresh Union regiments pushed the pursuit, and 
by late afternoon some of Thomas's artillery was firing 
on the main rebel fortifications just north of the river at 
Beech Grove. Since he thought it too late for an assault, 
Thomas made careful preparations for an early morning 
advance. But Crittenden, realizing that the fortifications 
on the north side of the river were untenable, decided 
to evacuate the ill-chosen position. During a hectic 
night the Noble Ellis, a little stern-wheeler, transferred 
most of the troops across the flooded stream. Panic de-
veloped as daybreak neared. Some soldiers had to be 
beaten off the overloaded vessel, and a number of 
others drowned trying to swim across the river. Sup-
plies, artillery, horses, the wounded-Crittenden had to 
abandon most of them. As he retreated to Gainesboro, 
Tennessee, to reorganize, Crittenden's army dwindled 
sharply as both men and officers deserted. Since the 
dead Zollicoffer had become a hero, Crittenden was 
blamed for the debacle; some critics insisted that his no-
torious intemperance had caused his failure. Although 
not found guilty of any charge, his military usefulness 
was ended. Crittenden resigned his commission in Oc-
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tober 1862 and spent the rest of the war in various 
minor positions. 
Thomas longed to move into eastern Tennessee, now 
almost unprotected; but, as he wrote Buell on January 
23, the poor roads and inadequate supplies in that area 
would not support his army. Instead, Buell authorized 
him to shift to Lebanon, from which point Thomas 
could cooperate in Buell's impending move toward 
Bowling Green. On the Confederate side com-
munications were so poor that General Johnston did not 
learn of the collapse of his right wing until he read an 
account of the battle in a copy of the Louisville Demo-
crat that had reached Bowling Green. If the report was 
true, he wrote the Richmond authorities, "East Tennes-
see is wide open to invasion, or, if the plan of the 
enemy be a combined movement upon Nashville, it is 
in jeopardy, unless a force can be placed to oppose a 
movement from Burke~. ville. . . ." 13 
East Tennessee was one of the least of Johnston's 
worries, for his line was crumbling at more important 
points. A small engagement at Belmont, Missouri, on 
November 7 had convinced General Polk in western 
Kentucky that he was about to be attacked by a much 
larger force based on Cairo, Illinois, and Mayfield. The 
bishop developed a fortress complex and. shielded him-
self at Columbus like a turtle withdrawing into his shell. 
Polk disclaimed any responsibility for Forts Henry and 
Donelson, which were supposed to block the Tennes-
see and Cumberland rivers, and Johnston, preoccupied 
with his immediate front, never ordered Polk to take the 
measures that might have saved the western end of the 
Confederate line in Kentucky. 
Both forts were poorly sited, constructed, and 
manned. Overshadowed by nearby hills, Fort Henry 
would be flooded during normal winter high water. The 
artillery here was so placed that it could fire only down-
stream, and its range was limited. When Johnston as-
sumed his command in September, Fort Donelson had 
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actually been abandoned, for most Tennessee authori-
ties were convinced that the Mississippi River would be 
the line for a Federal advance in the west. General 
Lloyd Tilghman of Paducah was appalled by the condi-
tion of the forts when he was placed in command of 
them in November, but he possessed little influence 
and was unable to secure the improvements that he rec-
ommended. 
Grant recognized the strategic importance of the 
Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and at the end of 
January 1862 he received permission from General 
Henry Halleck to move against the forts with the assis-
tance of gunboats. Since Tilghman had fewer than 3,000 
men at Fort Henry when the first Union troops ap-
peared on February 5, he wisely evacuated most of his 
troops before attempting a gallant but futile defense. 
Andrew H. Foote's gunboats and the rising wat~rs soon 
rendered the Confederate batteries ineffective, and 
Tilghman surrendered himself and fewer than 100 men 
early in the afternoon of February 6. Most of Grant's 
army had still not arrived, and the victory was a source 
of deep pride for the freshwater Union navy. 
In a belated outburst of activity Johnston ordered 
Generals Pillow, Buckner, and John B. Floyd to rush to 
Donelson and help save it. Uncertain even of the 
number and disposition of his own forces in that area, 
Johnston abdicated authority by writing Floyd on Feb-
ruary 8, "I cannot give you specific instructions and 
place under your command the entire force." 14 
The Union troops moved slowly and did not arrive 
before Fort Donelson until February 13. Poorly planned 
and still incomplete, it had been sited to guard the river 
and was highly vulnerable to a land attack. Confederate 
morale was bad, for many of the soldiers realized the 
predicament in which they had been placed. Supplies 
were scanty, and sleet and snow accompanied tempera-
tures well below freezing. 
Grant's advance units that arrived at Donelson on 
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February 13 numbered only some 12,000 men, while 
the Confederates had about 15,000. Floyd could have 
used this temporary superiority either to evacuate the 
fort safely or to destroy the Union vanguard before it 
was reinforced. But he vacillated and did neither, and 
by the next day he was outnumbered, with the odds 
lengthening steadily. Confederate spirits rose, however, 
when their river batteries damaged the Carondelet as 
that vessel tried to silence the Confederate guns. The 
next afternoon five gunboats renewed the attack, but 
four were disabled in a furious gun battle, and Grant 
had to revise his plans of capturing Donelson. 
As Grant strengthened his infantry positions, Floyd 
made a belated effort to escape. At cold dawn on Febru-
ary 15 the Confederates attacked, and by noon an es-
cape route to Nashville was almost clear. But no overall 
plan had been formulated, no one person was in firm 
control, and the Confederate command again failed 
when swift action was essential. The Confederate gen-
erals engaged in a bitter wrangle at the Dover Inn head-
quarters that evening about responsibility for the day's 
debacle and about the next day's course of action. Ignor-
ing Forrest's report that Wynn's Ferry Road was still 
open, they decided to surrender. Floyd seized the Gen-
eral Anderson, the only available steamboat, and fled 
with his two Virginia regiments. Pillow and the engi-
neer Jeremy Gilmer, who had done all too little to pre-
pare an adequate defense, departed in a rowboat. A rag-
ing Forrest refused to surrender and led his troopers 
through the floodwater to safety, a few infantrymen rid-
ing double with them. 
Buckner, unhappily left in sole command, proposed to 
Grant on the morning of February 16 that an armistice 
halt firing until noon while commissioners agreed upon 
terms of capitulation. Grant's reply made him an imme-
diate hero in the Union: "No terms except an uncondi-
tional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I pro-
pose to move immediately upon your works." Grant and 
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Buckner had been friends at West Point, and in 1854, 
after Grant's resignation from the army, Buckner had 
rescued him from an embarrassing financial situation in 
New York. Buckner may have expected more consider-
ation from his friend, but he had no choice but to "ac-
cept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you 
propose." The surrender involved nearly 12,000 men, 
20,000 stands of arms, and 48 artillery pieces. Then 
Grant took Buckner aside and quietly offered to place at 
his disposal any money that he needed.ls 
Columbus could no longer be defended, and that 
powerful bastion was soon evacuated by the Confeder-
ates. While the western end of his Kentucky line was 
disintegrating, Johnston remained preoccupied with the 
anticipated advance of Buell's army from its bases near 
Munfordville and South Carrollton on the Green River. 
Constant rumors reported Union movements, but John-
ston was frustrated by his inability to get reliable infor-
mation. When word arrived of the defeat at Mill Springs 
and of Grant's advance toward the river forts, Johnston 
admitted that the Bowling Green defenses on which so 
much labor had been lavished could not be held. Evac-
uation of the Confederate capital of Kentucky began on 
February 11. The two bridges spanning the Barren 
River were destroyed to impede the Union advance, 
and fires that broke out during and just after the Confed-
erates' departure heavily damaged the business section 
of town. Johnston's army retreated to Nashville and then 
abandoned that city without a struggle. By mid-
February 1862 Kentucky was almost cleared of Confed-
erate troops. On March 1 Bowling Green received the 
first regular United States mail since the arrival of the 
Confederates the previous September. l6 
.3 
THE GREAT INVASION 
GENERAL JOHNSTON was severely criticized for his 
retreat from Kentucky, and when he also abandoned 
Nashville and its vast accumulation of supplies to the 
enemy, his removal was angrily demanded by critics 
across the Confederacy. While Johnston assumed the 
entire blame for the disasters, Davis refused to remove 
him; and the general began to concentrate his troops at 
Corinth, Mississippi, where he was joined by Pierre G. 
T. Beauregard and Braxton Bragg. Unwilling to retreat 
farther, Johnston decided to strike Grant's army at Pitts-
burg Landing before it was reinforced by Buell's army 
from Nashville. The Confederates achieved a tactical 
surprise on Sunday, April 6, and made good headway 
before the Federals rallied. During the afternoon of 
fierce fighting, General Johnston moved to the front to 
push the attack personally. Struck by a ball that severed 
a leg artery, he refused to halt for medical aid and bled 
to death in the saddle, the rebel yell sounding in his 
ears as his troops fought on around him. Several Ken-
tucky regiments fought on both sides, and Johnston was 
only one of many Kentuckians who died on that bloody 
battle fie ld. 
Another casualty on the second day of battle was 
George Johnson, governor of Confederate Kentucky. He 
and his associates had accompanied the army on its re-
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treat across Tennessee. Johnson served as a volunteer 
aide on Breckinridge's staff on Sunday, but, although 
his horse was killed under him, he wanted more direct 
participation. Sworn in as a private in Company E, 
Fourth Kentucky Infantry, he was critically wounded 
Monday afternoon and left unattended on the field as 
the Confederate army was pushed back. Finally recog-
nized by Union General Alexander McCook, who had 
met him at the Charleston Democratic convention in 
1860, Johnson was given the best medical care possible. 
But the doctors could only alleviate his pain, and Gover-
nor Johnson died on April 9, many miles from the Ken-
tucky fields he loved. The Provisional Council elected 
Richard Hawes, a prominent lawyer and politician from 
Paris, to fill the vacancy. 
During the next several months Kentucky was the 
scene only of minor skirmishes as small Confederate de-
tachments slipped into the state to recruit men and 
horses, to harass the Union forces, and to hold them 
away from the major theaters of fighting. Perhaps the 
most important action was General George W. Morgan's 
flanking movement that forced the Confederates out of 
Cumberland Gap in June. Some of the Kentucky fight-
ing consisted of guerrilla action, for which the Confed-
erates were usually blamed. On May 27, 1862, Brigadier 
General Jeremiah Tilford Boyle, a native of Mercer 
County, was assigned command of what was later called 
the District of Kentucky. Determined to halt guerrilla 
activities and to suppress Confederate support, Boy Ie 
violated civil rights and aroused intense opposition to 
his numerous regulations. Property owners with Con-
federate sympathies were especially alarmed by the 
order of June 1 that set the tone for his command: 
"When damage shall be done to the person or property 
of loyal citizens by marauding bands of guerrillas, the 
disloyal of the neighborhood will be held responsible, 
and a military commission appointed to assess damages 
and enforce compensation." 1 
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Those persons accused of aiding the rebellion or sym-
pathizing with it were required to subscribe to a loyalty 
oath as a condition for release. "I do solemnly swear 
that I will bear true allegiance to the United States, and 
support and sustain the Constitution and laws thereof; 
that I will maintain the national sovereignty paramount 
to that of all state, county, or Confederate powers; that I 
will discountenance, discourage, and forever oppose se-
cession, rebellion, and disintegration of the Federal 
Union; that I disclaim and denounce all faith and fel-
lowship with the so-called Confederate armies; and 
pledge my honor, my property, and my life to the sacred 
performance of this my solemn oath of allegiance to the 
government of the United States of America." 2 
After the battle of Shiloh, Buell's army began a slow 
advance toward Chattanooga, and the war receded from 
Kentucky. But General Kirby Smith in eastern Tennes-
see became increasingly restive with the defensive pos-
ture into which he had been thrust. By early July he had 
indicated to various persons his desire to drive George 
Morgan from Cumberland Gap, or to invade Middle 
Tennessee behind Buell, or to move into Kentucky and 
recover that state for the Confederacy. His desire to in-
vade Kentucky was whetted by the acclaim John Hunt 
Morgan received for the first of his Kentucky raids. 
Although born in Alabama, John Hunt Morgan had 
strong Kentucky ties, and he was educated at Lexing-
ton's Transylvania College. After Mexican War service 
Morgan manufactured hemp products and conducted a 
general merchandising business in Lexington. He 
joined the Confederate army at Bowling Green and soon 
became noted for the hard-riding raids that became his 
trademark. His dash and audacity delighted many 
Southerners, who called him the Jeb Stuart of the West. 
Some orthodox military men, however, questioned the 
worth of his spectacular exploits, suggesting that he sel-
dom accomplished anything of permanent value. Basil 
Duke, Morgan's second in command and brother-in-law, 
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and George St. Leger Grenfell, an able if erratic British 
soldier of fortune, did much to compensate for Morgan's 
recklessness and disdain for such details as discipline. 
After the retreat from Kentucky, Morgan and his men 
had been active in Tennessee, clashing repeatedly with 
Colonel Frank Wolford and his "wild riders" of the 
First Kentucky Union Cavalry. 
Morgan and his men longed to return home, and in 
May 1862 he led some 50 men across the border with 
the avowed aim of disrupting the Union line of com-
munication. They took a look at Glasgow but decided to 
bypass it when they learned that a 500-man garrison was 
stationed there. They had better luck at Cave City, 
where they captured two trains. One was destroyed, but 
the other carried a number of Federal officers and their 
wives, and after the chagrined men had been paroled, 
Morgan gallantly returned the train for their trip back to 
Louisville. The raid actually accomplished little except 
to agitate some Union officials, but it encouraged 
Morgan to undertake another expedition, and its success 
made it easier for him to secure permission to stage a 
larger enterprise. 
Successful recruiting in Kentucky and the return from 
Virginia of200 Kentuckians who had served there in the 
First Kentucky Infantry enabled Morgan to build up his 
Second Kentucky Cavalry. Grenfell provided invaluable 
assistance in training the new men, and they developed 
a respectful affection for their mad Englishman. But he 
was never able to instill the discipline he had learned in 
the British army. "I never encountered such men," he 
complained, "who would fight like the devil, but would 
do as they pleased, like these damned Rebel cavalry-
men." 3 
On the Fourth ofJuly, 1862, Morgan led 876 officers 
and men westward from Knoxville in his first major Ken-
tucky raid. Turning north at Sparta, they entered Ken-
tucky after a night crossing of the Cumberland and cap-
tured Tompkinsville on July 9 in a brief fire fight that 
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netted them 300 prisoners. Then they rode to Glasgow, 
the home of most of the men in Company C. A heavy 
thunderstorm pelted the column as it neared Horse 
Cave, and the men sought shelter, while Morgan and a 
few companions rode on ahead. Among them was 
George Ellsworth, the telegrapher genius, whose work 
during the violent storm earned for him the name 
"Lightning." 
The Confederates forded the Green River and took 
Lebanon on July 12, capturing 200 of the enemy and a 
large ·depot of supplies. Much of Kentucky was panic-
stricken by this time. Morgan's command was expanded 
into a sizable army, and it was reliably reported to be in 
several parts of the state at the same time. After receiv-
ing frantic appeals for help, Lincoln sent word to Hal-
leck: "They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please 
look to it." General Boyle sought command assistance 
from General Nelson, who was then in Nashville: "I 
have no officers fit for the field .... Can you come?" 
His plea was reinforced by one from John W. Fennell, 
adjutant of the Kentucky Volunteers, who wired: "They 
are playing Hell in all the Central Counties. Are beating 
our forces in detail. We have no one in the field worth a 
damn." 4 
After a Sunday picnic in Harrodsburg, Confederate 
detachments trotted off to cut Bluegrass railroads while 
the main body moved toward Lexington. But that city 
was strongly held, and Morgan's troopers spent the 
night at nearby Georgetown. Several Confederates 
slipped across the Union lines to enjoy brief and dan-
gerous visits with families and friends, and a few volun-
teers managed to get through to join Morgan's com-
mand. Despite the stirring rhetoric of his recruiting 
proclamation-"I come to liberate you from the despo-
tism of a tyrannical faction and to rescue my native State 
from the hand of your oppressors" -Morgan was not 
overwhelmed by the number of volunteers.5 
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Cynthiana was stoutly defended by a motley but de-
termined group that included the Eighteenth Kentucky 
Infantry and some Cincinnati firemen, but after two 
hours the surviving Federals surrendered or fled. Since 
Morgan's pursuers were gaining on him, the prisoners 
were quickly paroled and the weary Confederates 
pushed on through Paris. At Richmond they acquired 50 
welcome recruits. Although Federal units were reported 
on every side, Morgan managed to elude them as he 
picked his way southward. During the brief halt at So-
merset, Ellsworth sent infuriating telegrams to several 
of the Confederates' particular enemies, including the 
editor George Prentice and General Boyle. The mes-
sage to the latter, carrying Morgan's name, said: "Good 
Morning, Jerry. The telegraph is a great institution. You 
should destroy it as it keeps me posted too well. My 
friend Ellsworth has all your dispatches since July 10 on 
file. Do you want copies?" 6 
In seeking permission for even larger raids, Morgan 
boasted that he had captured and paroled 1,200 enemy 
soldiers, recruited 300 men, "secured" several hundred 
horses, and used or destroyed extensive supplies in sev-
enteen towns. His casualties totaled fewer than 100 
men. The consternation spread by his appearance re-
stricted thousands of Union soldiers to guard duty in an 
effort to protect vital railroads, bridges, and supply de-
pots. Union General Jacob D. Cox resorted to poetry in 
an effort to discredit Morgan's acquisition of mounts. 
John Morgan's foot is on thy shore 
Kentucky! 0 Kentucky! 
His hand is on thy stable door 
Kentucky! 0 Kentucky! 
You'll see your good gray mare no more, 
He'll ride her till her back is sore 
And leave her at some stranger's door, 
Kentucky! 0 Kentucky! 7 
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Morgan's reports of his exploits increased Kirby 
Smith's determination to invade Kentucky with his 
army. An obvious complication was the need to coordi-
nate his moves with those of General Bragg, whose aim 
was to smash Buell's army in Middle Tennessee before 
undertaking any other scheme. The Confederate gov-
ernment had not provided a clear delineation of power 
between the generals, and a persistent Smith was able 
to impose his will on Bragg. Smith was aided by the in-
sistence of many exiled Kentuckians who swore that the 
commonwealth had been kept in the Union against the 
wishes of a majority of her citizens. Given an opportu-
nity, they declared, Kentucky would turn against her 
oppressors, and the boundary of the Confederacy would 
leap northward to the Ohio River. During the summer 
Bragg moved his army to Chattanooga, and Morgan and 
Forrest slashed at Buell's supply lines until he had to 
suspend his slow advance toward that city. By early 
August the Confederates were ready to take the offen-
sive. 
Bragg and Smith conferred at Chattanooga on July 3l. 
Bragg did not assert his seniority, and they apparently 
agreed to operate independently until they should come 
together in Kentucky, when Bragg would assume 
overall command. This decision insured that the cam-
paign would be poorly coordinated, for Smith did not 
like to serve under anyone, and he would not relinquish 
his independent command if he could avoid doing so. 
The plans made at the conference were vague, complex, 
and subject to various interpretations. Smith would 
force Federal General George W. Morgan out of Cum-
berland Gap. Then he would either participate in a 
move against Buell in Middle Tennessee or advance 
into Kentucky. General Humphrey Marshall, a mas-
sively proportioned Kentucky lawyer and politician who 
commanded 3,000 men in western Virginia, was to seal 
off the northern exit from Cumberland Gap when Smith 
moved against its defenders. John C. Breckinridge, then 
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leading a division in Earl Van Dorn's anny, was invited 
to join the impending festivities; his presence in Ken-
tucky was expected to attract substantial support. In an 
unusually jocular mood Bragg wrote Breckinridge on 
August 8: "My army has promised to make me military 
governor of Ohio in ninety days. . . , and as they can 
not do this without passing your home, I have thought 
you would like to have an escort to visit your family." 8 
Other Confederate armies in the West were expected to 
cooperate by exerting enough pressure to keep rein-
forcements from going to Buell. 
Smith's army marched on the night of August 13. 
Moving swiftly through the Cumberland Mountains, 
they took Barbourville on August 18 and snapped up 50 
wagons carrying provisions to the Gap. Determined to 
proceed on his own independent course, Smith in-
formed his superiors that the lack of supplies in a gener-
ally hostile area left him no alternative but to advance 
toward Lexington; he would not be able to join Bragg 
for an attack on Buell in the Nashville area. 
When Smith learned that heavy Union reinforcements 
were expected at Richmond, he decided to attack before 
they arrived. The battle opened early on the morning of 
August 30 at Kingston, a small village south of Rich-
mond. By midafternoon the stubborn Union troops had 
been pushed back to a ridge south of the larger town. 
General Nelson had not intended to fight there, because 
his inexperienced troops needed more training; but his 
orders to retreat on Lexington were not delivered to a 
senior officer until after the engagement was under way. 
Late in the afternoon the weary, thirsty Confederates 
made one supreme effort, and the Union line cracked at 
each end. Nelson propelled his vast bulk along the front 
in a vain effort to steady and inspire his inexperienced 
troops. "If they can't hit me they can't hit anything!" he 
assured them. But he was soon struck twice, and sudden 
panic swept through the ranks.9 
As the Union soldiers fled northward, John Scott's 
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cavalry slashed in to cut off their retreat. Nelson was 
captured but then managed to escape in the confusion 
of the battlefield. He left behind 1,000 casualties and 
4,300 prisoners from his army of some 6,500 men. The 
Confederates occupied Lexington on September 1 and 
Frankfort two days later. The Union line was suddenly 
back on the Ohio, and such river ports as Louisville, 
Cincinnati, Newport, and Covington were panic-
stricken. Many civilians and some troops fled across the 
river; others worked frantically to construct defenses 
that might save their towns. A visitor to Louisville found 
"the city in great confusion, all the stores . . . closed 
and troops. . . dashing about at a great rate," while the 
hotels were crowded with refugees.1o The editor of the 
Louisville Weekly Journal exhorted his readers on Sep-
tember 16: "We have time enough for everything but in-
activity." 
But Smith did not use the advantage he had created. 
He relinquished the initiative, scattered his troops over 
much of the Bluegrass, and waited passively for some-
thing to happen. During most of this period he was out 
of touch with Bragg despite the obvious need for a coor-
dinated campaign. Bragg had waited for his supply train 
to catch up with him and had not left Chattanooga until 
August 28. He had at last abandoned his hope of defeat-
ing Buell in Middle Tennessee before moving into Ken-
tucky. Now, he wrote Breckinridge, he would elude the 
Federal army and march into central Kentucky, where 
he hoped to find Smith. But his plans were still vague as 
his grey columns trudged northward across Tennessee; 
his lack of know ledge of Smith's position and intentions 
made it difficult for Bragg to formulate a campaign strat-
egy. 
Misled by false reports of ample supplies in the 
Glasgow area, Bragg swung west of the line of march he 
had first selected. He was appalled when Forrest re-
ported on September 9 that at least half of Buell's army 
was north of Nashville and marching toward the strong 
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fortifications at Bowling Green. Buell had been uncer-
tain of the Confederates' intentions, but he had concen-
trated his army at Nashville since that important supply 
point seemed their most likely target. Grant forwarded 
several thousand reinforcements, and when Bragg was 
reliably reported crossing into Kentucky, Buell's con-
fidence soared. "I believe Nashville can be held and 
Kentucky rescued," he wired Halleck. "What I have 
will be sufficient here with the defenses that are being 
prepared, and I propose to move with the remainder of 
the army against the enemy in Kentucky." 11 
Leaving General Thomas to guard the city, Buell 
marched for Bowling Green, whose strong fortifications 
stood only about thirty miles west of Glasgow. Deciding 
en route that Nashville was no longer seriously threat-
ened, Buell ordered Thomas to join him with two addi-
tional divisions. 
Once Bragg had decided to avoid a clash with Buell 
in Tennessee, he should have made every effort to 
achieve his goals in Kentucky, including a concentration 
with Smith, before Buell could arrive. But after an ex-
cellent start Bragg delayed three days at Sparta, Tennes-
see, and on September 14, when he reached Glasgow, 
Buell's army was already entering Bowling Green. The 
need for speed was urgent, but Bragg became em-
broiled in an unusual affair at Munfordville, where he 
won a battle that helped lose a campaign. 
The vital Louisville and Nashvilie Railroad crossed 
the Green River at Munfordville on five massive spans 
that towered 115 feet above the river and attracted Con-
federate raiders as a candle attracts moths. In mid-Sep-
tember 1862 the position was guarded by a detachment 
commanded by Colonel John T. Wilder, a thirty-two-
year-old iron manufacturer from Indiana. After his ar-
rival on September 8 Wilder drove his men hard to 
strengthen the inadequate defenses, but much still 
needed to be done when, on Saturday evening, Sep-
tember 13, he received a demand to surrender from Col-
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onel John Scott, who had been sent by Kirby Smith to 
locate Bragg. Wilder refused, and Scott sought the aid of 
General James R. Chalmers and his Mississippi brigade, 
who were at nearby Cave City. Acting on his own initia-
tive, Chalmers moved up to support Scott, and the Con-
federates attacked at early dawn on Sunday morning. 
The Union troops repulsed them with murderous rifle 
fire that inflicted more than 200 casualties. 
At midmorning Chalmers penned another deJTIand for 
surrender "to avoid further bloodshed." Wilder, replied 
tartly: "If you want to avoid further bloodshed keep out 
of the range of my guns." 12 The arrival of reinforce-
ments, though complicating the command situation be-
cause Colonel Cyrus L. Dunham was senior to Wilder, 
brought the strength of the Federal garrison to 4,000 
men. Chalmers and Scott, conceding that the nut was 
too hard for them to crack, sought assistance from the 
main army at Glasgow. 
Bragg was furious when he learned of Chalmers's 
"unauthorized and unjudicious" action, but he agreed 
that the Union position would now have to be taken. 
The army started moving out of Glasgow on September 
15, and on the next day a fuming Bragg arrived at M un-
fordville to take personal charge of the unfortunate af-
fair. General Buckner, whose home was nearby, per-
suaded his irate superior to surround the Union force 
instead of launching a massive assault that might endan-
ger the town and its inhabitants. General William J. 
Hardee positioned his troops on the south side of the 
river, while General Polk crossed upstream from the 
Union fortifications and moved in behind the defenders. 
These dispositions took time, and Bragg delayed the 
final assault until Wednesday morning, September 17. 
Wilder's weary men continued to beat off minor probing 
attacks. 
Late Tuesday afternoon Bragg again demanded capit-
ulation to avoid "the terrible consequences of assault." 
A council of war called by Colonel Dunham concluded 
44 
that resistance was impossible if the Confederates really 
had the overwhelming force they claimed. Dunham 
telegraphed this decision to Louisville, and he was or-
dered to turn his command over to Wilder; when Dun-
ham refused to serve under an officer junior in rank, he 
was ordered to place himself under arrest. Wilder 
agreed with his predecessor that surrender should be 
considered if the situation was really hopeless. But he 
was not a professional soldier, and he was uncertain 
about the honorable course of action to follow under 
such conditions as he faced. Should ,he accept or reject 
Bragg's ultimatum to surrender unconditionally within 
an hour? In his dilemma the Hoosier officer paid 
Buckner a supreme compliment. 
When Wilder and Buckner met under another flag of 
truce late Tuesday evening, Wilder astounded the Ken-
tuckian by declaring, "I came to you to find out what I 
ought to do." Military matters were not usually handled 
that way, Buckner protested, but the approach intrigued 
him. "I wouldn't have deceived that man under those 
circumstances for anything," he later explained.13 When 
Buckner repeated that the Federals were trapped by a 
much larger army that would overrun them at dawn, 
Wilder replied that his troops "had been summoned 
four times to surrender, with like assurances of their 
power to compel it, and we at each time successfully 
repelled the attack. ... " Could he see for himself if he 
was now hopelessly outnumbered? 
Buckner did not hesitate; he was so delighted by the 
affair that Wilder's request seemed quite logical. Colo-
nel Wilder was escorted around the southern portion of 
the Confederate lines while his adjutant checked the 
forces north of the river. When they compared counts, 
Wilder concluded that Buckner had not exaggerated. 
"Well, it seems to me, General Buckner, that I ought to 
surrender." But Buckner had become so thoroughly en-
meshed in his role that he cautioned Wilder to wait: "If 
you have information that would induce you to think, 
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that the sacrificing of every man at this place would give 
your army an advantage elsewhere, it is your duty to do 
it." Wilder considered the situation carefully, but he 
had no such information. "1 believe that 1 will surren-
der," he said.14 
Details were arranged during the early morning 
hours, and at six o'clock on September 17 the Union 
troops marched to nearby Rowlett's Station, the surren-
der point. The 155 officers and 3,921 men were immedi-
ately paroled, provided with rations, and directed to-
ward Bowling Green, where their presence might 
complicate Buell's supply problem. In General Orders, 
Bragg congratulated his army on its victory but warned: 
"Our labors are not over. A powerful foe is assembling 
in our front and we must prepare to strike him a sudden 
and decisive blow. A short time can therefore be given 
for repose, when we must resume our march to still 
more brilliant victories." The following day was to be 
devoted to such repose and to thanksgiving and 
prayer.15 
Bragg may have sought divine guidance himself, for 
he was still uncertain of his next move. On the evening 
of Wilder's surrender he learned that Buell's army was 
already on the road north of Bowling Green, but the 
reports failed to reveal clearly the intentions of the 
Union army. Buckner's division was moved southward, 
either as a reconnaissance in force or as a possible at-
tempt to lure Buell into attacking, but no serious contact 
was made. Bragg wavered for another day while the 
Union army Howed up to and by him to the west; then 
on September 20 the well-rested Confederates at last 
resumed their march northward. At Nolin, Bragg turned 
his column toward Bardstown, where Kirby Smith was 
expected to join him. But Smith was not there, and 
Bragg abandoned his hope of capturing Louisville and 
went on the defensive. Buell arrived in Louisville on 
September 25 and in a commendable outburst of energy 
set to work immediately to prepare his army for an ad-
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vance against the enemy, who occupied most of the 
Bluegrass and spilled out over its edges. 
Despondent over his failure to attain a major goal, 
Bragg began to consider retiring to Danville or some 
other suitable point where he could concentrate his 
scattered troops and perhaps fight upon ground of his 
choosing. As early as September 25 he warned General 
Samuel Cooper, Confederate adjutant and inspector 
general, that Kentucky might have to be abandoned 
with the possibility of heavy losses as the Confederate 
army retreated.l6 Bragg was beginning to realize that he 
had not required the concerted effort necessary to make 
his strategy work. His most serious blunder had been-
and continued to be-the failure to achieve close coor-
dination with Smith. The fault was certainly not all 
Bragg's; Smith had shown only a remote interest in 
what Bragg was doing; but the final responsibility be-
longed to Braxton Bragg. 
Instead of joining Bragg at Bardstown, Smith had ac-
tually moved away from that point. He had assumed that 
Humphrey Marshall would be able to cut off George 
Morgan if the latter attempted to escape from his precar-
ious position at Cumberland Gap. Marshall got into po-
sition at Mount Sterling to intercept Morgan, and Smith 
rushed troops there to insure the kill. But George 
Morgan escaped the trap, fought off John Hunt Morgan, 
who tried to check him, and made a brilliant forced 
march to the safety of the Ohio River. As a consequence 
of this affair, the Confederate troops in Kentucky were 
more widely dispersed than ever. 
But on one important point the Confederate com-
manders were united: they shared a bitter disappoint-
ment over the failure of Kentuckians to join their armies 
in large numbers. The wagon trains had hauled thou-
sands of stands of arms to equip the anticipated horde of 
volunteers, but most of the rifles remained in the 
wagons, despite the obvious Confederate sympathy of 
many of the state's inhabitants. "Their hearts were evi-
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dently with us, but their blue-grass and fat-grass [cattle] 
are against us," Smith complained to Bragg,17 Recruit-
ment might have been more successful had the immen-
sely popular Breckinridge been there as a rallying point, 
but he was delayed so long in leaving Van Dorn's com-
mand that the invasion had ended before he could get to 
Kentucky. Bragg and Smith sought recruits to help in-
sure victory; many Confederate sympathizers demanded 
a victory first. 
Once he assumed the defensive, Bragg's plan was to 
defeat the Union army on a field of his own choosing, 
and then seek the important objectives, such as Louis-
ville and Cincinnati, that had eluded his grasp. Since 
his army could not be concentrated indefinitely at one 
spot, Bragg dispersed his troops over a wide area, with 
Polk near Bardstown, Pat Cleburne and Preston Smith 
at Shelbyville, Harry Heth at Georgetown, and Carter 
Stevenson near Danville. Kirby Smith, near Frankfort, 
was still operating independently. The order of concen-
tration would have to depend upon Buell's line of ap-
proach, but it would have to be done quickly or the 
Confederates might be destroyed piecemeal by the 
much larger Union army. 
Bragg himself paid a visit to Frankfort. There was 
some forlorn hope that the establishment here of the 
Confederate government of Kentucky would spur enlist-
ments. It would create an aura of permanence that the 
government in exile had not been able to present; in-
deed, it could even provide for conscription, which 
often had a salutary effect upon volunteering. Governor 
Hawes had been in Virginia when the invasion started, 
but he passed through Chattanooga on September 17 
and caught up with the army a few days later. On Octo-
ber 3 Bragg wrote Polk from Frankfort: "Tomorrow we 
inaugurate the civil Governor here, and transfer to him 
all that department." 18 
The ceremonies began at noon before a large audi-
ence of soldiers and civilians. Relying on Bragg's prom-
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ises, Hawes assured his listeners that his government 
would remain in Frankfort and that the commonwealth 
would soon be free of enemy troops. But Union General 
Joshua Sill was already nearing the city, and by midaf-
ternoon the Confederates were hastily evacuating the 
capital. Governor Hawes left the executive mansion he 
had occupied for a few hours, and the great inaugural 
ball planned for that evening was never held. For the 
rest of the war the Confederate government of Kentucky 
was in exile, sometimes with the western armies, in 
which so many Kentuckians fought, and sometimes in 
Richmond, where it survived on the charity of the Con-
federate States of America. The council passed laws and 
the governor issued orders, but they had no appreciable 
effect on the course of events in Kentucky. 
Bragg had grossly underestimated Bue II' s ability to 
prepare rapidly for an advance. The Confederate gen-
eral had anticipated a respite of several weeks, but even 
as he prepared for Hawes's inauguration, a large force of 
Union cavalry was reported near Shelbyville. Then 
Shelbyville was reported captured as Cleburne pulled 
back rapidly to avoid being overrun. Frankfort was sud-
denly endangered, and Bragg's army faced the prospects 
of being sliced in half. He issued vague orders for 
Frankfort to be held while Polk smashed into the flank 
of the Union army. But Polk was also under heavy pres-
sure at Bardstown and was pulling back his advance 
units to save them; it was doubtful that he could hold 
his position, much less make the flank attack. After 
meeting with his subordinates, Polk began withdrawing 
toward the army's depot at Bryantsville. His report to 
Bragg was vague and incomplete at a time when the 
commanding general needed all possible assistance in 
arriving at some decision that might retrieve the deteri-
orating situation. 
The confused and underinformed Confederate com-
mander decided to retreat to Harrodsburg, where Polk 
would join him. But Kirby Smith asked for and received 
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permission to remain north of the Kentucky River; he 
thought that he might be able to hold Lexington against 
what he assumed was Buell's main thrust. Although 
Bragg lacked information about both the enemy and his 
own forces, he wrote Smith on October 5: "It is my in-
tention to move on the enemy whether at Shelbyville or 
Frankfort as soon as my force arrives here." 19 Since 
Polk had not indicated strong pressure on his front, 
Bragg assumed that Smith was correct in believing that 
the main Union advance was against him. Bragg began 
to plan a move to Versailles, west of Lexington, where 
he could cooperate with Smith to halt Buell's army. But 
Buell's advance resembled a giant hand thrust south-
eastward from Louisville, and only one finger was 
directed toward Kirby Smith's position; the major con-
frontation would occur elsewhere. 
On the night of October 6 General Hardee camped 
his troops around Perryville, where water was available 
in Salt River and some smaller streams (a prolonged 
drought had severely complicated the problem of find-
ing adequate supplies of water for large bodies of men 
and horses). The next day Joe Wheeler's hard-working 
cavalrymen reported Union infantry in the vicinity. Har-
dee was not alarmed, although he did forward the report 
to Polk. In midafternoon Hardee wrote Bragg that 
Wheeler was being pushed hard and a fight would prob-
ably occur the next day. If Bragg was not occupied else-
where, perhaps he might send some reinforcements and 
come to assume personal command. Hardee's words 
still carried no sense of urgency despite his postbattle 
claims that he had provided ample warning and had ad-
vised Bragg to concentrate the entire Confederate army 
at Perryville. 
Annoyed by the threat against Perryville, Bragg or-
dered Polk to send Ben Cheatham's division back to 
help Hardee rout the enemy before coming on to Ver-
sailles. The Federal forces nearing Perryville had in-
creased ominously by October 8, and Polk hastily sum-
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moned a council of war that morning to decide what 
should be done. Bragg had ordered an immediate attack 
on what he thought was a relatively minor force, but the 
council's decision was to take a defensive position on a 
ridge east of Chaplin's Fork, a small stream on the west 
side of Perryville. Yet when Polk wrote Bragg, he did 
not indicate that he was outnumbered, he did not 
request reinforcements, and he did not report the coun-
cil's decision to go on the defensive. Bragg made many 
mistakes of his own during the Kentucky campaign, but 
blame for his failure to concentrate his forces for the 
decisive battle in Kentucky must be accorded in large 
measure to Smith, Polk, and Hardee, who failed to 
supply him with the information needed for a compe-
tent decision. Few Confederate armies ever experi-
enced such a disastrous breakdown of communications 
among senior officers. 
Bragg rode to Perryville on October 8 to brush off the 
mysterious enemy force that was disrupting his plans. 
Angered by the defensive stance Polk had assumed, 
Bragg began shifting his troops for an assault that he 
hoped to launch about one o'clock that afternoon. Polk 
would open the affair on the right by sending 
Cheatham's division against the Yankees who occupied 
a ridge west of shallow Doctor's Fork. Then Hardee 
would advance the center and left of the Confederate 
line, and the troublesome Federals would be crushed. 
The difficulty was that Buell had been informed that 
Bragg's main army was at Perryville and he was concen-
trating the bulk of his command, some 58,000 men, at 
that point. Sill, with 12,000 men on the left of the Union 
advance, was occupying Kirby Smith's attention. 
Charles C. Gilbert's corps was in the center of the forces 
approaching Perryville, with McCook on the left and 
Thomas L. Crittenden on the right. General George H. 
Thomas, Buell's second in command, accompanied Crit-
tenden. The flanks were supposed to be on a line with 
Gilbert and ready to attack by early morning, October 8. 
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THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE 
Both were late, and the morning's activities consisted 
largely of minor skirmishing, some desultory exchanges 
of artillery fire, and a futile Confederate effort to drive 
the Federals away from the precious pools of water in 
Doctor's Fork. Troops in both armies suffered from 
thirst as the day wore on. 
The Confederate attack was delayed by the appear-
ance of a Union column that could have struck Polk's 
flank had he exposed it, but finally Cheatham moved 
toward his objective. Well-sited Union artillery caused 
heavy casualties in his division and forced the survivors 
to seek shelter in a patch of trees. George Maney's Ten-
nessee brigade followed in support, was checked, then 
surged forward under his leadership and broke the 
Union line. Much of McCook's corps was thrown into 
disorder, but some seasoned troops fought desperately 
and slowed the Confederate advance. Shoved back 
nearly three-quarters of a mile, McCook asked General 
Phil Sheridan of Gilbert's corps for help, but Sheridan 
was engaged with two Confederate brigades and could 
not give assistance. 
Atmospheric quirks apparently prevented both Bragg 
and Buell from hearing the early battle sounds. When 
the thunder of the guns and the crackle of rifle fire fi-
nally reached Buell after three o'clock, he sent General 
Gilbert to find out what was happening. As news ar-
rived, Buell finally realized that a major engagement 
was well under way and that matters were not going 
well for him. When darkness fell over the parched bat-
tlefield, his right wing had been badly mauled and his 
army had suffered casualties of 845 killed, 2,851 
wounded, and 515 missing. Confederate losses had also 
been heavy: 510 killed, 2,635 wounded, and 251 miss-
ing. In his official report Bragg asserted, "For the time 
engaged, it was the severest and most desperately con-
tested engagement within my knowledge." 20 
While details sought the wounded, and thirsty 
soldiers searched for water, Bragg, Polk, and Hardee as-
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sessed their situation. Although they had gained the 
day's advantage, their losses had been extremely heavy 
in proportion to the number engaged. With 15,000 men 
they had fought most of the Army of the Ohio. Their 
weak left flank had endured severe pressure; a Union 
brigade had actually penetrated Perryville before being 
expelled. The weary, outnumbered Confederates might 
be overwhelmed when fighting resumed at dawn. Re-
treat was the only way to save what remained of the 
army, and on October 9 Bragg pulled back to Harrods-
burg, where he hoped to unite all his forces. But Har-
rodsburg was also a potential trap, with the Federals 
threatening to envelop it; and Bragg continued his re-
treat toward Bryantsville, his main supply depot. The 
busy Wheeler reported Yankee efforts to outflank the 
Confederate army and cut it off from Cumberland Gap. 
At last aware of their danger, the Confederates began 
to join forces. Smith reached Harrodsburg on October 
10 as Polk led his men across Dick's River toward 
Bryantsville. The close pursuit by strong Union units 
forced Bragg to form a battle line along Salt River with 
Smith's troops and the tail end of Polk's column. 
Wheeler fought savagely to hold Danville as long as 
possible, and Humphrey Marshall struggled to control 
the Kentucky River bridge on the Cumberland Gap 
road. 
On October 12 Bragg assembled Smith, Polk, 
Cheatham, Hardee, and Marshall for a council of war to 
discuss future plans. Finally convinced that his great in-
vasion had failed, Bragg concluded that he must pre-
serve his army in order to oppose a Union march into 
the deep South. Sterling Price and Van Dom had been 
crushed at Corinth on October 3-4, and only Bragg's 
army could prevent the capture of Chattanooga and 
points south. The 2,500 Kentuckians who had joined the 
Confederate "army of liberation" did not even compen-
sate for the campaign's losses, and they fell far short of 
the 20,000 to 30,000 volunteers who had been expected 
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to rally to the Stars and Bars. Bragg had declared earlier 
that the army could not remain in Kentucky unless a 
large number of Kentuckians joined it. They had not 
done so, and Bragg commented bitterly to his wife: 
"Why then should I stay with my handful of brave 
Southern men to fight for cowards who sulked about in 
the dark to say to us, 'We are with you, only whip these 
fellows out of our country, and let us see you can protect 
us, and we will join you.' "21 Such sentiments helped 
make Bragg the most unpopular general of the Confed-
erate army among Kentuckians. 
When the Confederate generals decided that retreat 
was necessary before they were cut off, Marshall was 
given permission to remain in the Bluegrass as long as 
possible; then he was to go to western Virginia. The rest 
of the army began moving at daybreak on October 13 
toward Cumberland Gap, the long lines of wagons 
creaking their way in the van and Wheeler's weary 
horsemen helping protect the rear. The supply trains 
still carried the thousands of unissued weapons that 
were to have armed Kentucky's volunteers. 
Buell pursued the Confederates as far as London, but 
he was unable to force an engagement, as Wheeler con-
ducted a brilliant rearguard action. Buell terminated the 
chase there and prepared to shift his army back to Nash-
ville, where he would resume his drive into the South-
ern heartland. His superiors were not pleased with his 
plans and the escape of the Confederate army. "I am 
directed by the President," Halleck wrote, "to say to 
you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, 
and that it ought to move there while the roads are pass-
able .... He does not understand why we cannot 
march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight 
as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops 
and our generals." One of his soldiers complained that 
Buell "has shown himself to be ether a coward or a Tra-
tor, for with such a force as ours, properly handled, old 
Bragg could never have escaped." 22 Buell was unable 
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to convince his superiors of the soundness of his plan, 
but he began to shift his army westward anyway. By the 
time it reached the vicinity of Glasgow and Bowling 
Green, he was no longer its commander. Replaced by 
General William S. Rosecrans, the savior of Kentucky 
went to Indianapolis to wait for orders. 
4 
THE END OF 
THE STRUGGLE 
~E 1862 INVASION of Kentucky was the high-water 
mark of the Confederacy in the West. The state would 
be the scene of numerous minor actions during the rest 
of the war; but after Bragg and Kirby Smith led their 
weary troops into Tennessee, the Confederate threat to 
seize Kentucky was at an end. During the next two and 
a half years the most important Confederate incursions 
were those of John Hunt Morgan, but they were raids 
designed to destroy bridges and railroads, capture 
horses and supplies, gain recruits, and disrupt the 
Union war effort as much as possible by tying down 
troops that could have been used elsewhere. Such raids 
were annoying, sometimes even embarrassing, but they 
did not pose a serious threat to Union forces in the state. 
As the Confederate forces withdrew from the state, 
the Kentuckians felt betrayed by the refusal of their 
generals to fight a decisive battle. "With the failure to 
hold Kentucky," Duke later wrote, "our best and last 
chance to win the war was thrown away. . . . All the 
subsequent tremendous struggle was but the dying 
agony of a great cause, and a gallant people." 1 The Ken-
tucky soldiers blamed Bragg more than Smith for the 
debacle, and much of their scorn for Bragg came from 
their belief that he lacked the courage to fight. 
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As the Confederate infantry toiled toward the safety of 
Cumberland Gap, it became apparent that the Union 
pursuit did not represent a real threat. Morgan's Second 
Kentucky Cavalry was helping cover Kirby Smith's re-
treat, and about October 15 Morgan apparently dis-
cussed with Smith the possibility of his swinging back 
through the Bluegrass, damaging Buell's supply lines, 
and entering Tennessee somewhere west of Bowling 
Green. Such a raid would do something to restore 
morale, and it would allow Morgan and his men to dis-
sodate themselves from the ignominious retreat of the 
main army. There is some doubt that Smith positively 
sanctioned the move, but he did not veto the request, 
and that was good enough for Morgan. 
The Second Kentucky turned northward on October 
17 and, using backroads to avoid the enemy, reached 
Lexington on October 18. There they routed the Fourth 
Ohio Cavalry that was guarding the town, although 
some Confederate units fired on each other in the confu-
sion of an early dawn attack. Three hundred prisoners 
were paroled, and almost before sympathizers could un-
furl their Confederate flags, Morgan's column was on 
the road toward Versailles. Pursued by Union General 
Ebenezer Dumont, who had surprised and embarrassed 
him at Lebanon, Tennessee, the previous spring, 
Morgan moved swiftly through Lawrenceburg and 
Bloomfield. "Hour after hour we rode, men and horses 
exhausted," one of Morgan's men later recalled. "As 
soon as one horse gave out another was procured and 
the ride continued through all that day and all that 
night. ... At day-light no signs of the enemy were 
seen." 2 
On the night of October 19 a patrol led by Lieutenant 
James Sale of E Company intercepted a Union supply 
train near Bardstown. Most of the wagons and their con-
tents had to be burned, except for two sutlers' wagons 
whose loads of boots and gingerbread were rushed back 
to the main body. Other detachments screened the col-
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umn's progress and confused the pursuers, and the 
Confederates passed leisurely through Elizabethtown 
on October 20. They disrupted traffic on the L & N 
Railroad, and then rode on to Morgantown, where they 
crossed the Green River on October 22. An unseason-
able snowstorm swirled in when they reached Green-
ville, and by morning Duke found the field in which his 
men had camped "marked by white mounds, under 
each of which lay one or more sleepers. The field really 
looked like a grave yard enshrouded in snow." 3 
Any danger of being caught had ended, and the caval-
rymen frolicked through lovely Indian summer weather 
that quickly melted the snow to Hopkinsville, where 
they had many supporters. Morgan lingered there for 
five days, resting his men and horses and trying unsuc-
cessfully to persuade Colonel Thomas G. Woodward to 
resolve an unfortunate duplication of unit designations 
by merging his Second Kentucky Cavalry with 
Morgan's. On November 1 Morgan crossed the Tennes-
see line and camped near Springfield. Within a few days 
he was actively engaged in the same game of raid and 
counterraid that had enlivened existence in northern 
Tennessee the previous spring. 
In December, Morgan was promoted to the rank of 
brigadier general, and his command was increased to 
brigade strength with the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Kentucky regiments and the Four-
teenth Tennessee. The social event of the season was 
Morgan's December wedding to Miss Martha Ready of 
Murfreesboro; General Polk performed the ceremony. 
Many of Morgan's men later dated the change in their 
fortunes from the day of the marriage. Morgan's honey-
moon was brief, for Bragg had decided to send him back 
into Kentucky to cut General Rosecrans's L & N supply 
line. All indications were that Rosecrans planned to ini-
tiate a winter campaign as soon as sufficient supplies 
were accumulated at his Nashville base. The L & N 
tracks were now heavily guarded, but Morgan decided 
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that the two massive trestles north of Elizabethtown 
where the line traversed Muldraugh's Hill might be vul-
nerable. Forrest was sent into western Tennessee on a 
similar mission, but Bragg's decision to mount the raids 
came too late to prevent an engagement of the armies at 
Stone's River at the end of the year. 
Organized into the First Brigade under Duke and the 
Second Brigade under William C. P. Breckinridge, the 
Confederates started on Morgan's "Christmas Raid" on 
December 22. They crossed the Kentucky line on 
Christmas Eve, when Lieutenant James McCreary 
wrote: "Cheer after cheer and shout after shout echoed 
for miles toward the rear of the column, breaking the 
stillness of the night. Tonight we are camped on the 
sacred soil of old Kentucky and it fills my heart with joy. 
. . . campfires illuminate every hill and valley and the 
fires bum brighter, seemingly are more cheerful, be-
cause it is the fatherland." 4 Christmas for Morgan's 
men was also brightened by the capture of a huge 
twenty-horse sutler's wagon loaded with delicacies for 
the Union garrison at Glasgow. They camped that night 
five miles from Glasgow, and some of the scouts who 
slipped into town encountered Union soldiers as they 
all converged on a saloon. 
The raiders rode through Glasgow on Christmas Day, 
then headed for Munfordville on the Green River. After 
fighting a small skirmish at Bear Wallow, they crossed 
the river in a cold rain. The Union troops guarding the 
Bacon Creek bridge of the L & N resisted stubbornly 
before surrendering, but the bridge was destroyed for 
the third time. Several miles of track were tom up, and 
Rosecrans's supply line was disrupted, regardless of 
what might happen later. 
As they approached Elizabethtown on December 27, 
the Confederat~s were summoned to surrender by Colo-
nel H. S. Smith, the Federal commander, who told them 
they were surrounded.s Morgan insisted that Smith had 
reversed the actual situation; he was the one who 
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should capitulate, since it was he who was surrounded. 
Smith fought briskly for a short while, and then ran up 
the white flag for his 600 men. The next day the Confed-
erates captured the stockades that guarded the railroad 
trestles and burned the massive structures. It was March 
1863 before service was restored on that portion of the 
L & N. His mission accomplished, Morgan turned his 
attention to the problem of escaping to Tennessee 
through the net of Union troops bent on destroying him. 
His decision was to move eastward before turning 
south; a visit to his beloved Bluegrass was a lure he 
could seldom resist. 
Colonel John M. Harlan was so close that his artillery 
shelled Morgan's rearguard as it crossed the flooded 
Rolling Fork River on December 29. Duke, struck by a 
shell fragment, was loaded into a carriage and hurried to 
Bardstown for medical attention. General Boyle heard 
that Duke had been killed and sent Lincoln a gleeful 
report to that effect. But Duke responded to medical at-
tention, and when the Confederates left Bardstown the 
next day, the commander of the First Brigade accom-
panied them, lolling in unusual comfort in a buggy 
cushioned with featherbeds. 
A freezing rain plagued the camp at Springfield, and 
Tom Quirk's scouts said that several thousand aroused 
Federals were concentrated at Lebanon, only nine 
miles away. Ten thousand others were reported block-
ing the roads to the Cumberland River; Colonel Frank 
Wolford's First Kentucky troopers were among those 
moving in for the kill. Deciding that he could not fight 
his way through Lebanon, Morgan bypassed it on a 
forced march that started an hour before midnight. 
While a few companies feinted an attack on the town 
and burned rail fences to simulate campfires, the main 
body swung around the town to the Campbellsville 
road. Men who made that march later described it as 
their most miserable night of the war. Freezing rain 
turned to sleet, and coats of ice soon covered men and 
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horses; troopers had to dismount frequently to avoid 
freezing in the saddle. Men and horses slipped and slid 
on the treacherous footing through the long night. 
But they reached Campbellsville safely and dined 
there New Year's Eve on captured supplies. Their de-
termined pursuers were still coming on when the Con-
federate column passed through Columbia on the first 
day of 1863. During the afternoon they heard the dull 
rumble of distant artillery fire; although they did not 
know it then, the sound came from the savage fighting at 
distant Stone's River, where other Kentuckians played 
an important role and suffered heavy casualties. Their 
Union pursuers finally left behind, the- Confederates 
crossed into Tennessee on January 3. 
Morgan reported only 2 men killed and 24 wounded. 
Of the 64 who were missing a number later rejoined the 
command. He claimed nearly 2,000 Union casualties, 
including the paroled prisoners, and the destruction of 
large amounts of military supplies. The impact of the 
raid on Rosecrans's supply problem was indicated by a 
telegram from General Horatio G. Wright in Cincinnati 
to General Boyle in Kentucky: "We must open the 
railroad soon or Rosecrans will starve." 6 
During the next few months Confederate detach-
ments continued to infiltrate among the Union garrisons 
trying to protect the state. Colonel Roy S. Clukes's 
Eighth Kentucky Cavalry crossed the Cumberland on 
February 18 in bitterly cold weather. For several weeks 
the 750 Confederates sustained themselves in the Blue-
grass although they were under constant threat and 
frequent attack. General John Pegram, who had been 
Kirby Smith's chief of staff during the 1862 invasion, led 
his cavalry brigade into the state and captured Danville 
on March 24 despite stout resistance from Wolford's 
command. Pegram withdrew across the Cumberland 
River after a sharp clash with General Q. A. Gillmore 
near Somerset on March 30. General Humphrey Mar-
shall drove into eastern Kentucky from his Virginia the-
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ater in late March, but Union troops checked him near 
Louisa. A Confederate raid on Tompkinsville on April 
22 resulted in the burning of the courthouse and several 
other buildings; a week later a Confederate force was 
driven away from Monticello. On May 11 several 
hundred soldiers participated in a fight in Wayne 
County, and on May 13 a skirmish was fought near 
Woodburn in Warren County. 
And the forays continued. Pegram reentered the state 
and skirmished with Federal troops near Monticello. A 
small Confederate unit was defeated on Wilson's Creek 
near Boston on June 13. A raid at Elizabethtown the 
same day did some damage to L & N rolling stock. 
Three hundred Confederate cavalry raided Maysville on 
June 14; Olympia Springs in Bath County was the site 
of a small action on June 15; a somewhat more extensive 
engagement was fought near Morehead on June 16. On 
June 18 Captain Thomas Hines, one of Morgan's ad-
vance men, crossed the Ohio River into Indiana with 
some 65 soldiers. The Union forces could do little but 
react to the Confederate raids, for the initiative lay with 
the enemy. It was a period of hard riding and endless 
frustration for the Union troops, and they may have felt 
some sense of relief when Morgan raised the level of 
the raids to a more visible one. 
His appetite for fame whetted by the acclaim received 
for his exploits in Kentucky and Tennessee, Morgan 
dreamed of still greater glory. Guarding Bragg's right 
flank during the spring of 1863 was a boring task, the 
more irksome because under General Wheeler's conser-
vative direction. Morgan must have known that many of 
his officers and men believed that he had lost much of 
his dash and verve when he took a bride, and he 
yearned to refurbish his reputation. Morgan believed in 
carrying the war to the enemy, and sometime during the 
late spring he sought Bragg's permission to raid across 
the Ohio River. Such an excursion, he suggested, would 
create enough havoc and excitement to tie up thousands 
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of troops that otherwise would go to reinforce Rose-
crans. He may also have hoped to make some contact 
with the underground Copperhead movement in the 
Old Northwest. 
Bragg's army, concentrated around Tullahoma, Ten-
nessee, had been weakened in the effort to save Vicks-
burg from Grant's relentless advance, and Bragg de-
cided that he must withdraw toward Chattanooga. But a 
swift move by Rosencrans might catch the Confederates 
strung out on the march, and thus Bragg was glad to 
sanction a raid that would divert the Federals' attention 
elsewhere at the critical moment. Morgan was given 
permission to lead another raid into Kentucky, but he 
was ordered not to cross the Ohio River. Morgan had al-
ready sent men to scout the fords along the upper Ohio 
that he might use during their return, and he told Duke 
that they were going to invade the North regardless of 
orders. If Lee was still in Pennsylvania, Morgan said, 
they might even ride to join him instead of returning to 
Bragg's army. As Duke later wrote, "He did not disguise 
from himself the great danger he encountered, but was 
sanguine of success." 7 
In late May, Morgan concentrated his regiments, in-
cluding the new Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, in the area be-
tween Liberty and Alexandria, Tennessee. Remounts 
were available; supply wagons suddenly appeared; the 
troops were worked into excellent condition. They were 
ready to move out by June 11, but a Federal raiding 
party was reported headed for Knoxville and Morgan 
was ordered to intercept it. For three miserable weeks 
the Confederates floundered in mud and rough terrain 
without ever finding the enemy; when the raid finally 
started, both men and horses had lost the fine condition 
Morgan had worked to achieve. But he refused to delay 
longer, and on July 2, 1863, some 2,460 men crossed the 
flooded Cumberland River near Burkesville. Boats were 
scarce, and many of the men stripped off their clothes 
and swam their mounts across the stream, hanging on to 
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the floating tails. A small group of Union soldiers who 
chanced to be there were amazed by the sudden attack 
by naked and half-dressed Confederates. 
The Union commanders in Kentucky had been aware 
of the danger of another sizable Confederate attack. The 
area along the southern border from the mountains in 
the east to heavily fortified Bowling Green formed a 
broad gateway into the state that had already been used 
many times. Despite his efforts to maintain secrecy, 
rumors of Morgan's intended raid had seeped into Ken-
tucky. General James M. Shackleford, who had orga-
nized the Eighth Kentucky Cavalry in August 1862, had 
been shifted eastward from Russellville to intercept 
Morgan if he entered through the southern gateway. 
General Edward Henry Hobson had predicted Morgan's 
point of entry almost exactly, but his superior, General 
Henry M. Judah, had created a gap by ordering Hob-
son's Second Brigade, Third Division, to move from the 
vicinity of Columbia to Glasgow.s 
The Confederates spent the night of July 3 in or near 
Columbia without encountering serious opposition, but 
scouts came back to report that the Union garrison at 
Tebb's Bend on the Green River was alert, well dug in, 
and prepared to fight. When the Confederates moved up 
the next day, Morgan made his usual demand for imme-
diate and unconditional surrender. Colonel Orlando 
Moore had confidence in his Twenty-fifth Michigan In-
fantry, however; noting that it was Independence Day, 
he replied cheerfully, "It is a bad day for surrender, and 
I would rather not." 9 Colonel D. W. Chenault dis-
mounted his men and led the Eleventh Kentucky in a 
headlong assault that Moore beat off with volleys of rifle 
fire. Chenault was killed in the futile charge, and when 
Morgan finally bypassed the position, leaving the de-
fiant Moore in command of the field, the Confederates 
had suffered seventy-one casualties. It was, perhaps, an 
omen of the difficulties that lay ahead. 
Strong opposition was encountered again the next day 
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at Lebanon, where Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hanson 
commanded the Twentieth Kentucky Infantry and de-
tachments from three other Kentucky regiments. Believ-
ing that help was on the way, Hanson held out for some 
time in the brick railroad depot before surrendering. 
Among the Confederate casualties was Morgan's nine-
teen-year-old brother, Tom. Since Union troops were re-
ported nearing the town, the Confederates moved out 
rapidly toward Springfield, their pace impeded by a 
heavy rainstorm and by the prisoners there had been no 
time to parole. They splashed on through the wet night 
and reached Bardstown near daybreak on July 6. 
The pursuit was more persistent than Morgan had an-
ticipated. He had often humiliated his opponents, and 
they were grimly determined that this time the outcome 
would be different. Fifty-five-year-old Major Starling in 
Shackleford's command typified the new spirit. At Leb-
anon on July 6 he penned a hasty note to his daughters: 
"I am here, we go at once to Bardstown in pursuit of 
Morgan. Am well, have not pulled off my boots for a 
week & sleep every night under a tree. Farewell, I 
know not how this pursuit will end-but I'll be killed 
or kill some one if we come up with Morgan." When 
"Lightning" Ellsworth took over the telegraph office at 
Lebanon Junction, he learned that strong cavalry units 
were no more than a day behind and that troops were 
being hastily gathered to protect Louisville from the an-
ticipated attack. Citizens were being enrolled in compa-
nies for the defense of the city, and business houses 
were ordered closed to facilitate the construction of for-
tifications. tO 
But Morgan had already selected Brandenburg as his 
crossing point, and he had rushed units on ahead to 
seize boats there and to make contact with Captain 
Thomas Hines, the mysterious gentleman who had been 
scouting possible routes for some weeks and who was 
reputed to have established contacts with Confederate 
sympathizers in the Old Northwest. Two companies 
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were sent into the area between Louisville and Frank-
fort in an effort to convince Union authorities that 
Morgan was once again moving into the Bluegrass. Such 
tactics failed to fool the hard-riding pursuers, who main-
tained their killing pace. 
On July 7 the Confederate advance guard captured 
two river steamers, the John B. McCombs and the Alice 
Dean, and embarkation began when the main body ar-
rived the next morning. A motley crew of local militia 
and a gallant little gunboat delayed the crossing for an 
hour, l;mt by midnight all of the Confederates were on 
the north shore of the Ohio. The advance Union units 
arrived in Brandenburg just as the crossing was com-
pleted. 
Intense excitement spread through the Ohio Valley 
during the next three weeks as the Confederate raiders 
were chased across southern Indiana and Ohio. Major 
Starling explained to his daughters why the Union cav-
alry was not able to close the gap: "We followed him 
from Burksville steadily, gaining nothing on him, for his 
scouts took literally every horse within miles of the 
road, leaving none for us to recruit from, his way was 
sprinkled with broken down horses left on the road." 
They would never catch up, Starling complained, 
"unless some force meets him in front and delays his 
progress." 11 
By July 19 the flooded fords of the Ohio were guarded 
by gunboats and troops had been rushed upstream by 
steamers. The Union cavalry at last caught up, and at 
Buffington Island, Duke surrendered 700 men after 
holding out long enough for Morgan and 1,100 others to 
escape the trap in which they had become ensnarled. 
More than 300 of the hard-pressed Confederates crossed 
the deep ford at Belleville, West Virginia, but the others 
were turned back by the arrival of one of the ubiquitous 
gunboats. Morgan's command dwindled day by day as 
exhausted men collapsed, and when he finally surren-
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dered near Lisbon, Ohio, on July 26, 1863, he had only 
363 men with him. The long ride was ended, and the 
Confederates were sent to various prison camps. Wol-
ford and Morgan had served together during the Mex-
ican War, and they shared a deep mutual respect. Wol-
ford conducted Morgan and his officers to Wellsville, 
where they were to catch a train for Cincinnati. While 
they waited, he invited them to share a chicken dinner 
at the hotel and generously extended other hospitality. 
"Gentlemen, you are my guests," he was reputed to 
have told the Confederates whom he had chased for 
several hundred miles. "This hotel together with its bar, 
cigar stand, and other accessories is at your service and 
my expense. Do not go off the square in front of the 
hotel." 12 
Morgan and several of his officers escaped from the 
Columbus penitentiary in late November, just after the 
remnants of his command under Adam Johnson had par-
ticipated in the Confederate defeat at Missionary Ridge. 
Morgan found Confederate authorities much cooler to-
ward him than they had been in the past, and Bragg 
threatened to court-martial him for disobeying orders. 
But because the Confederacy needed leaders desper-
ately, Morgan was restored to command. Although he 
gradually built up his force, never again did it possess 
the elan of the outfit that entered Kentucky in July 1863. 
During the remainder of 1863 and the early months of 
1864 Kentucky was the scene of many small-scale en-
gagements, most of which were officially described as 
skirmishes. Small Confederate units could slip into the 
state with little difficulty, and during relatively peaceful 
interludes Confederate commanders often gave permis-
sion for Kentuckians to return to their native state to 
visit family and friends, to acquire badly needed horses, 
to harass the Union defenders, and perhaps to gain a 
few recruits. The harried Union commanders rushed 
troops hither and yon in vain efforts to rid Kentucky of 
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the Confederate interlopers. As the war lengthened, 
many of those hunted were guerrillas who had little if 
any legitimate connection with either army. 
During the spring of 1864 the western end of the state 
was the scene of a more serious raid conducted by For-
rest, who had been active in Kentucky during the early 
days of the war. Commissioned major general in De-
cember 1863, Forrest had sought and received an in-
dependent command in western Tennessee and north-
ern Mississippi when he found it impossible to serve 
any longer under Bragg. In the spring of 1864 this leg-
endary warrier decided to raid the western part of Ken-
tucky. One reason for doing so was to secure mounts for 
some footsore Kentuckians who were tired of marching. 
Abraham Buford, an 1841 graduate of West Point, had 
resigned his commission in 1854 and built a fine stock 
farm near Versailles. He maintained personal neutrality 
until 1862, when he accepted a Confederate commis-
sion as brigadier general. After serving in the Vicksburg 
campaign, he was ordered to report to Forrest with the 
fragments of three Kentucky infantry regiments that had 
been in Bragg's army. These Kentuckians had requested 
permission to reorganize as mounted infantry, but the 
Confederacy could not supply horses for them. Their 
hope of securing mounts depended upon Forrest's suc-
cess in his raid. 
Forrest started his column on March 15 with nearly 
2,800 men, including the Kentucky infantry. Federal 
General Stephen A. Hurlbut in Memphis exaggerated 
the size of the Confederate force but was reasonably ac-
curate as to its destination: "It is reported that Forrest, 
with about seven thousand men, was at Tupelo last 
night, bound for west Tennessee," he warned; "I think 
he means Columbus and Paducah." After taking Union 
City, Tennessee, the Confederates pushed on to Padu-
cah on the Ohio River. Advance units drove the Union 
troops there aboard gunboats or into the earthwork fort 
that guarded the western side of the town. Colonel S. G. 
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Hicks, commander of the Fortieth Illinois Infantry, had 
665 men and considerable courage; when the Confeder-
ates demanded unconditional surrender, Hicks refused. 
Forrest's main objectives were horses and supplies; he 
had no intention of wasting lives by assaulting the fort. 
But one of his brigade commanders, Colonel A. P. 
Thompson, a resident of that area, launched a senseless 
and futile attack in which he and two dozen of his Ken-
tuckians were killed or wounded. In his official report 
General Forrest declared: "I . . . drove the enemy to 
their gunboats and fort, and held the town for ten hours. 
. . . Captured many stores and horses; burned up sixty 
bales of cotton, one steamer, and the dry-dock, bringing 
out 50 prisoners." 13 
Most of Forrest's men returned to Tennessee, but a 
portion of General Buford's command was temporarily 
disbanded at Mayfield so that the men could visit their 
homes and secure better clothing and horses. They 
promised to report to Trenton, Tennessee, on April 4, 
and members of the outfit later claimed that every man 
returned as promised to his unit. Some Unionist news-
papers carried gleeful stories that the government's 
horses and mules in Paducah had been hidden so well 
that Forrest had obtained only the animals stolen from 
private citizens. Incensed by this report, Buford went 
back into Kentucky to get the animals they were alleged 
to have missed. A small force demonstrated against Co-
lumbus to draw Union attention there, but Buford's 
main unit arrived at Paducah on April 14 and again 
drove Hicks into the safety of his fort. The Confederates 
found 140 good horses in a foundry, just as the newspa-
pers had reported, and Buford took them with him as he 
rode southward to rejoin Forrest. In the aftermath of 
these raids, there was a considerable shakeup of Union 
commanders in western Tennessee and Kentucky. 
Soon after Forrest left Kentucky, Morgan moved back 
in. Despite strong reservations among top officials about 
his reliability, Morgan had succeeded in building up his 
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command to some 2,700 men, about one-third of them 
dismounted. Although his command area was south-
western Virginia, Morgan's heart was in the Bluegrass; 
and during the spring some of his scouts drifted into the 
state to ascertain the enemy's strength and dispositions. 
On May 31 he informed the War Department that he 
was leaving Wytheville to raid in Kentucky; he was out 
of touch with Richmond before he could be ordered to 
return. 
The horseless soldiers delayed the others despite 
doubling up. For a week the column stumbled through 
difficult terrain that one officer maintained had "little 
for man to eat and nothing for horse." 14 The weary sur-
vivors reached Mount Sterling in early morning on 
June 8, and 300 surprised Union soldiers surrendered 
almost immediately. Then came the main blemish on 
Morgan's record. Some of his men and officers got out of 
control, looting the town thoroughly and taking more 
than $70,000 from the bank. Morgan did not order a full 
investigation when the outrages were called to his at-
tention, and his reputation was tarnished by rumors that 
he had shared in the loot. At the least, he was inexcus-
ably negligent in failing to take prompt, decisive action 
against the offenders. Grenfell was gone and Duke was 
still in a Union prison; they had provided much of the 
discipline in earlier years. 
When Morgan moved out toward Lexington, he left 
Colonel Henry Giltner's troopers and Lieutenant Colo-
nel Robert M. Martin's reluctant infantry behind to de-
stroy supplies and search for horses. But General Ste-
phen G. Burbridge had learned of the Confederates' 
location, and their camp was suddenly overrun by 
Union troopers and the Forty-fifth Kentucky Infantry. 
Two hundred fifty Confederates were captured; the rest 
escaped because the Federal troops were too exhausted 
by their forced march to take up the pursuit at once. 
Morgan considered turning back to deal with the threat 
closing in behind him, but he ultimately decided to 
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push on to Lexington, where 5,000 mounts were re-
ported gathered. 
Lexington was so poorly guarded that John Castle-
man, who rode in during the early morning hours, had 
some difficulty in finding anyone to hear his demand for 
surrender. After the railroad depot and some military 
storehouses were burned, the battery guarding the town 
surrendered. Here also a considerable amount of looting 
occurred. The Lexington Observer & Reporter re-
marked wryly that although Morgan was there only a 
few hours, "he made good use of his time, as many 
empty store shelves and pockets will attest." 15 Morgan 
took the opportunity for a brief visit to his home; it was 
the last time that he would ever see it. 
The pursuers were closing in, and by midafternoon 
the Confederates, all of them now mounted, were riding 
for Georgetown with a herd of extra horses trailing the 
column. There was more looting in Georgetown. 
Morgan had lost control over his men, and he was fast 
losing the confidence of some officers who could not un-
derstand or accept his unwillingness to deal with the 
breakdown in discipline. From Georgetown the Confed-
erates rode through a long night for Cynthiana, which 
they captured early in the morning of June 11. Much of 
the town burned during the battle that resulted in 500 
prisoners. Morgan wrote Richmond, "The enemy took 
shelter in the houses, and I was forced to burn a large 
portion of the town"; 16 but some of his own followers 
doubted that the fires had been necessary. 
Even as the garrison surrendered, word came that 
General Hobson, who had helped capture Morgan in 
1863, was approaching with a large detachment. Some-
how the Confederates shook off their fatigue and proved 
that they were still capable of conducting an operation 
as they had done so often in earlier years. Giltner 
engaged the enemy, while Morgan and Colonel D. 
Howard Smith circled Hobson's Hank and charged into 
his rear. White Hags went up almost at once, and the 
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amazed Confederates found themselves with 1,300 pris-
oners. They posed a new problem, for Union soldiers 
were now forbidden, under threat of court-martial, to 
give their paroles. If they were turned loose they would 
soon rejoin the pursuit, but could they possibly be car-
ried into Confederate lines? Morgan and his officers 
argued over what should be done. Convinced that other 
Union troops must be near, Giltner urged immediate 
departure, even if the prisoners had to be abandoned. 
But Morgan insisted that there was no danger, that 
they would whip Burbridge when he came up, that ev-
eryone needed rest, that perhaps some arrangement 
could be made with the prisoners. His will prevailed, 
and the troops bedded down for the night. As Giltner 
made the round of his guardposts, he told an aide that 
he feared disaster was confronting them. "General 
Morgan is a very likeable man, and a genius in raiding; 
but he is such an optimist. I have advised him to leave 
at once but he persists in remaining and fighting Bur-
bridge's command with near-empty guns. In all proba-
bility he will attack us at daybreak tomorrow." 17 
Giltner was right. Burbridge stormed the Confederate 
camp at dawn on Sunday morning, June 12. The Fed-
erals outnumbered the Confederates at least two to one, 
and some of Morgan's units soon exhausted their ammu-
nition. In the panic that developed, the bridge over the 
Licking River was jammed with terrified horses and 
riders. About 250 Confederates were killed or captured, 
and the rest were so badly scattered that weeks passed 
before many of them straggled back into Virginia. 
Morgan reached Abingdon on June 20 with the largest 
group that escaped, but it was a pitiful remnant of the 
command with which he had left only three weeks ear-
lier. 
Bragg and other Richmond authorities received re-
ports from Kentucky assailing Morgan's actions there, 
and several of his senior officers asked the War Depart-
ment to investigate the charges when Morgan stub-
74 
bornly refused to do so. On August 30 the general was 
suspended from command and a court of inquiry was or-
dered for September 10. But when a Union force was re-
ported moving toward Bull's Gap, Morgan ignored his 
suspension and moved to intercept it; he established his 
headquarters in Greeneville, Tennessee, on September 
3. The Union commanders may have been told by a 
local Unionist sympathizer that Morgan was spending 
the night in the town. Early Sunday morning General 
Alvin C. Gillem's men swarmed into the town, and John 
Hunt Morgan was killed as he tried to reach his troops. 
Among those who attended his funeral in Abingdon 
were the members of the court of inquiry who had con-
vened there to consider his guilt. 
Small-scale fighting continued in Kentucky until the 
end of the war, for there was no way to prevent raiders 
from slipping into the state. But there was no invasion 
of real consequence after the spring of 1864, and guer-
rilla activities that bore little relationship to military 
operations accounted for much of the continued blood-
shed. Although many of the guerrillas claimed some 
military association, they were an embarrassment to 
their putative commanders, and their actions were repu-
diated by the governments they pretended to serve. 
Champ Clark did not exaggerate when he recalled, 
"The land swarmed with cutthroats, robbers, thieves, 
firebugs, and malefactors of every degree and kind, who 
preyed upon the old, the infirm, the helpless, and com-
mitted thousands of brutal and heinous crimes-in the 
name of the Union or the Southern Confederacy." Citi-
zens were killed, property was stolen or destroyed, and 
courthouses were burned; no Kentucky county escaped 
such outrages. W. F. Wickersham expressed the opinion 
of many Kentuckians toward bushwhackers when he 
told members of his family, " ... if you catch one of 
them I want you to kill the infernal scamps of the earth, 
they are not fit for no place but hell. . . ." 18 
The most notorious Kentucky guerrilla was probably 
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"Sue Mundy," who as Captain Jerome Clarke had 
served in Morgan's command. He returned to Kentucky 
after his leader's death and began his nefarious career in 
October 1864. The confusion concerning his identity 
and the uncertainty over his sex intrigued the public, 
and Clarke was blamed for depredations he could not 
have committed. He and two companions, one critically 
wounded, were captured in a tobacco barn near Bran-
denburg on March 12, 1865, after an informer told 
Union authorities of their hideout. Clarke, "alias Sue 
Mundy," was tried in Louisville by a hastily convened 
military commission, found guilty, and hanged on the 
afternoon of March 15 before a crowd estimated at sev-
eral thousand persons. l9 
William Clarke Quantrill, who had become notorious 
for his activities in Kansas before and during the war, 
transferred his attentions to Kentucky in January 1865. 
He and several dozen heavily armed desperadoes en-
tered the state near Canton and then moved eastward, 
committing crimes in such communities as Hartford, 
Hustonville, and Danville. Quantrill may even have 
joined Sue Mundy for raids on Midway and New Mar-
ket. A militia company under the determined leadership 
of Captain J. H. Bridgewater inflicted serious losses on 
Quantrill's band but failed to destroy it. Then Major 
General John M. Palmer employed Edwin Terrill, the 
leader of some Unionist guerrillas in Spencer County, to 
complete the job. Terrill caught Quantrill at a hideout 
near Bloomfield on May 10. Severely wounded during 
his attempted escape, Quantrill died in the Louisville 
military prison hospital on June 6. His men who had es-
caped Terrill finally surrendered to an army officer at 
Wakefield on July 26.20 
In their efforts to suppress guerrilla activities the 
Union authorities embarked upon a repressive and at 
least partially unconstitutional program that aroused a 
great deal of civilian resentment. In the summer of 1862 
General Boyle ordered penalties for anyone who aided 
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the marauders and announced that military commissions 
would supervise the payment by disloyal persons for 
damages done to loyal citizens. When some Union men 
in the Caneyville area were robbed, Confederate sym-
pathizers were assessed $35,000. In 1864 the legislature 
established fines up to $5,000 and imprisonment up to 
one year for "disloyal and treasonable practices" and 
provided "a civil remedy for injuries done by disloyal 
persons." An act of February 22, 1864, allowed double 
indemnity through civil action for depredation losses. 
Governor Thomas E. Bramlette promised that the guer-
rillas would be stopped "even though every arm be 
required to aid in their destruction," and in January 
1864 he ordered five rebel sympathizers arrested and 
held as hostages for the safe return of any loyal person 
who might be carried off. A Frankfort editor commen-
ted, "We have but one amendment to make to the proc-
lamation, and that is, every guerrilla and marauder who 
is caught, ought to be hung upon the first tree." 21 
Much of the odium for enforcing the antiguerrilla pro-
visions fell upon General Burbridge, who became com-
mander of the military district of Kentucky on February 
5, 1864. It would have been a trying position for anyone, 
but 'the thirty-two-year-old farmer from Logan County 
lacked the experience and tact needed for the job. In his 
zeal to enforce the laws he antagonized much of the 
state, including many staunch Unionists. As the officer 
in charge, he was blamed for the congressional act of 
July 2, 1864, that gave military courts jurisdiction over 
the "guerrilla-marauders" and for President Lincoln's 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and invocation 
of martial law on July 5. Burbridge himself was respon-
sible for instituting an infamous retaliation policy. Four 
guerrilla prisoners were to be shot for each Union man 
killed. Some of those executed were apparently legiti-
mate Confederate prisoners of war, and a storm of pro-
test swept the state. After July 16 any Confederate sym-
pathizer within five miles of a guerrilla raid was subject 
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to arrest and banishment from the country. An order of 
October 26, 1864, to take no more guerrilla prisoners 
stirred up even more opposition. Men who were be-
lieved to have influence with the Union authorities re-
ceived many pitiful pleas for help. They received scant 
encouragement from Robert J. Breckinridge, whose own 
family had divided over the issue of the war. His minis-
terial studies had evidently been concentrated on the 
Old Testament, for his stern admonition contained little 
mercy: "Treat them all alike, and if there are any among 
them who are not rebels at heart, God will take care of 
them and save them at least." 22 
Enraged and frustrated by the assistance rendered 
Confederates who slipped into the state, some Union 
authorities made little effort to distinguish between 
loyal and disloyal citizens. A War Department agent, 
speaking for many military officials in the state, wrote 
Secretary Edwin M. Stanton in late 1864, "A large ma-
jority of Kentuckians are today undoubtedly disloyal." 23 
Governor Bramlette frequently protested odious poli-
cies and their insensitive enforcement, and he was 
joined by a wide spectrum of the state's press and pub-
lic figures. Prolonged efforts by the governor and legis-
lature to secure the removal of General Burbridge fi-
nally succeeded in February 1865. The Louisville 
Journal of February 10 carried a brief announcement: 
"Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer of Illinois had been ap-
pointed to command in Kentucky. Thank God and Presi-
dent Lincoln." 
Palmer was a more tactful administrator than his pre-
decessor; but since the policies he enforced remained 
essentially the same, he soon became unpopular in his 
own right. The end of the war eliminated the most obvi-
ous possibilities for discontent, although Kentucky was 
treated much like a conquered province during the Re-
construction era. Much of Kentucky's postwar bitterness 
toward the federal government stemmed from the prob-
lems that developed during the last two years of the 
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war. Kentucky's resentment of the repressive program 
and her anger over the freeing of the slaves did much to 
shape her postwar political stance. 
As the long conflict drew to a close, Kentuckians con-
tinued to fight on battlefields far distant from the green 
hills of home. General Duke had some 600 men in his 
brigade in western Virginia when Lee surrendered at 
Appomattox. Their horses were not up from winter graz-
ing, and so Duke mounted his men on mules taken from 
a supply train and headed south to join Joe Johnston's 
army in North Carolina. Only 10 of his men decided to 
stay behind, and Duke wrote of his followers, "Braver 
in the hour of despair than ever before, they never fal-
tered or murmured." After Johnston surrendered, the 
Kentuckians formed a large part of the escort for Presi-
dent Davis and the remnants of the Confederate govern-
ment in their flight. A South Carolina lady denounced 
the "thieving, rascally Kentuckians" who had taken 
forage from her barn. They were "afraid to go home," 
she declared, "while our boys are surrendering de-
cently." One of the Kentuckians replied: "Madam, you 
are speaking out of your turn; South Carolina had a good 
deal to say in getting up this war, but we Kentuckians 
have contracted to close it out." 24 
They were true to their contract, remaining with 
Davis until he decided to attempt escape with a smaller 
group. Some of the other units then surrendered, but 
Duke had not received any order to do so. Almost sur-
rounded by much larger Union forces, he waited until 
Major General John C. Breckinridge, then Confederate 
secretary of war, sent word for them to yield. Further 
resistance would be foolish, Breckinridge said. They 
should return home and take up civilian lives as soon as 
possible. They were not to make any effort to help him 
escape: "I will not have one of these young men en-
counter one hazard more for my sake." 
"We communicated his message to our comrades," 
Duke wrote, "and for us the long agony was over." 25 
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5 
THE IMPACT 
OF THE WAR 
KENTUCKY DID NOT experience as much physical 
damage as some of the other states in which the war was 
fought, but there were few citizens of the com-
monwealth whose lives were not affected in some way 
by the demands of the great conflict. Kentuckians have 
long been noted for their unusual political behavior, 
and the waging of war intensified the political battles at 
home. 
The Unionist legislature elected in 1861 passed a 
series of measures in late 1861 and early 1862 designed 
to curb Confederate support and to lend assistance to 
the Union. Loyalty oaths were required of teachers, 
ministers, and jurors, in addition to public officials; and 
severe penalties were provided for any Kentuckian who 
invaded the state, enlisted in the Confederate army, or 
enticed anyone else to enlist. A fine of $50 to $100 was 
levied against anyone who displayed a Confederate flag, 
and the legislators formally expelled several members 
who had joined the Confederacy. After the state's neu-
trality ended, the legislature declared that United States 
Senators John C. Breckinridge and Lazarus W. Powell 
"do not represent the will of the people of Kentucky." 
Breckrinridge resolved the charge by joining the Con-
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federate army; he would be the only Confederate to 
hold both a cabinet post and a military rank as high as 
major general. Powell, however, defended himself ably 
against charges of disloyalty and finally won a 28-11 
vote of confidence from his colleagues in Washington.! 
A particular problem for Kentucky Unionists, as al-
ready noted, was the presence of Governor Magoffin, 
who had been elected in 1859 on the Democratic ticket. 
Confronted by hostile legislative majorities after the 
1861 election, Magoffin could do little more than delay 
the actions of his Unionist opponents, who overrrode 
his vetoes with little effort. Well aware of his precarious 
position, the governor was careful to execute the mea-
sures enacted over his objections. In a September mes-
sage to the legislature he acknowledged his belief in 
states' rights, but asserted, "My functions are purely ex-
ecutive, and I am bound by my oath of office to carry out 
the lawful will of the people, whether the policy they 
prefer accords with my own views or not." 2 As early as 
September 30 a resolution calling for his resignation 
was introduced in the Senate. While the resolution died 
in committee, criticism did not cease. 
The legislature stripped the governor of many of his 
constitutional powers, such as control over the state's 
military forces; yet he was blamed for the Confederate 
invasions of the state and for the excesses of General 
Boyle. in enforcing laws that the governor had opposed. 
His tone was almost plaintive when he asserted, "I have 
been more untiring in my honest efforts, to preserve, 
and have made more propositions to prevent, a dissolu-
tion of the Union ... than all of my busy, brawling 
calumniators, who had their vile purposes to serve." 3 
His position became increasingly untenable, and in 
mid-August 1862 he participated in one of the most un-
usual political maneuvers in the commonwealth's his-
tory. 
On August 16 Magoffin informed the legislature that 
W. A. Dudley, state quartermaster general, had recently 
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inquired if there was any truth to the rumors of his res-
ignation. Dudley urged him to resign, both for his own 
sake and for the welfare of the state. In his reply, Magof-
fin told Dudley that certain conditions would have to be 
met before he could consider such action. "Could I be 
assured, that my successor would be a conservative, just 
man, of high position and character, and that his policy 
would be conciliatory and impartial toward alllaw-abid-
ing citizens, however much they may differ in opinion; 
and that the constitutional rights of our people would be 
regarded, and the subordination of the military to the 
civil power be insisted on and maintained to the utmost 
extent our disturbed condition will admit, I would not 
hesitate an instant in putting off the cares of office, and 
in tendering him my best wishes for the success of his 
administration." 4 The snag was that Lieutenant Gover-
nor Linn Boyd had died in office, and Speaker of the 
Senate John F. Fisk, next in line of succession, did not 
meet Magoffin's requirements. But on August 16 in a 
bewildering series of moves Fisk resigned as speaker, 
Senator James F. Robinson was elected unanimously to 
replace him, and the governor announced his resigna-
tion, to be effective at ten o'clock on Monday morning, 
August 18. In a gesture of cordiality lacking for some 
time, the legislature invited Magoffin to attend Robin-
son's inauguration in the house chamber. With the 
change safely made, Fisk was then reelected to the 
speakership from which he had so recently resigned. 
Another embarrassment for the Unionists was General 
Boyle, whose zeal often antagonized even members of 
his own party. Boyle interfered in the 1862 local elec-
tions by publishing an order on July 21 that threatened 
arrest on the charge of treason for any candidate whose 
opinions were hostile to the national government. The 
Unionists would have won most of the elections any-
way, and the main effect of this blatant interference 
with the political process was to drive citizens into op-
position. The Southern Rights party called for a conven-
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tion to meet on February 18, 1863, to nominate can-
didates for state offices; many Unionists were convinced 
that the real purpose was to promote secession. The 
House of Representatives refused to allow its premises 
to be used for the convention, and when the delegates 
met in Frankfort's Metropolitan Hall, Colonel E. A. Gil-
bert moved infantrymen to the site. He would not allow 
disloyal sentiments to be uttered, the colonel declared; 
nominees would not be permitted to run and, if some-
how elected, would be prevented from serving. "Such 
meetings as this you shall not hold within the limits of 
my command;. . . you will disperse to your homes, and 
in future desist from all such efforts to precipitate civil 
war upon your State." 5 Even the ·Unionist Senate pro-
tested Gilbert's novel approach to the elective process. 
The Union Democracy, as its adherents called them-
selves, held its state convention in Louisville on March 
1S-19, 1863, with a distinctly military flavor. General 
Boyle was an active candidate for the nomination for 
governor, but he had antagonized too many people, and 
Joshua F. Bell was selected. A month later Bell de-
clined the honor, partly because of poor health, partly 
because of the dominance of the military in the state. On 
May 2 the party's central committee replaced him with 
Thomas E. Bramlette, who had recently resigned from 
the army because of a dispute over his command. The 
Union Democrats and their candidate would try to dis-
sociate themselves from the Lincoln administration, 
but they were inevitably tied to it in the view of many 
disenchanted Kentuckians. 
The result was the formation of another party called 
the Peace Democrats. In June 1863 several leading poli-
ticians, including W. F. Bullock, L. S. Trimble, Joshua 
F. Bullitt, and W. A. Dudley, asked Charles A. Wickliffe 
to make the race for governor. They were careful to de-
nounce secession in order to avoid being associated 
with it: "We hold this rebellion utterly unjustifiable in 
its inception, and the dissolution of the Union the great-
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est of calamities. We would see all just and constitu-
tional means adopted to the suppression of the one and 
restoration of the other." 6 But they attacked the military 
excesses in the state, and they condemned such mea-
sures of the federal government as the Emancipation 
Proclamation, which had offended many white Ken-
tuckians although it did not apply to the state. 
The campaign was bitterly fought, with the Peace 
Democrats being accused of favoring secession and pro-
tecting traitors and the Union Democrats being blamed 
for the actions of the Lincoln administration and the 
commonwealth's military authorities. It was a measure 
of Lincoln's popularity in his native state that both par-
ties sought to dissociate themselves from him and his 
administration. The Tri-Weekly Commonwealth of April 
1, 1863, asserted flatly, "No administration man can be 
elected in Kentucky," and most of the candidates ap-
peared to agree. 7 Bramlette advocated support of the 
president, but his reasoning was that the sooner the war 
ended, the sooner the state could get rid of Lincoln's 
obnoxious policies and measures. 
In a proclamation dated July 10 Governor Robinson 
pointed out that many citizens had been disenfran-
chised by various war measures and thus should not be 
allowed to vote. The army intervened actively to pre-
vent the election of Wickliffe and others of his party. 
Five days before the election General Boyle announced 
his candidacy for the congressional seat left vacant by 
the death of John J. Crittenden. In an order dated July 
25 the general declared that voting for Wickliffe would 
constitute sufficient proof of Confederate sympathies to 
permit the seizure of rebel property. Six days later, Gen-
eral Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Depart-
ment of the Ohio, declared martial law in the state. He 
did so, he explained, to keep disloyal persons from vot-
ing and to make possible a free election. Anyone who 
attempted to vote without being able to establish his 
right to do so was to be arrested as a rebel. A formidable 
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barrier was the test oath that was required: "I do sol-
emnly swear that I have never entered the service of 
the so-called Confederate States; that I have never been 
engaged in the service of the so-called 'provisional gov-
ernment of Kentucky,' either in a civil or military capac-
ity; that I have never, either directly or indirectly, aided 
the rebellion against the United States or the State of 
Kentucky; that I am unconditionally for the Union and 
the suppression of the rebellion, and am willing to fur-
nish men and money for the vigorous prosecution of the 
war against the rebellious league known as the 'Confed-
erate States'; so help me God." 8 
The Peace Democracy candidates were kept off the 
ballot in a number of counties, and in the First District, 
Judge Trimble, a well-known leader of the party, was 
held in prison until after the election. Suspected citi-
zens were harassed and often prevented from voting. 
"Well the election is over, if election it could be called," 
Maria Knott wrote a few days later. "People had to 
vote just as the military saw fit or not at all, conse-
quently a small vote was polled .... Not much credit 
for Ky. remaining union when she cant help herself." 9 
Bramlette defeated Wickliffe by approximately 68,000 
votes to 18,000, and the Union Democrats strengthened 
their hold on the legislature. Governor Bramlette started 
his term by voicing strong support for the policies of the 
federal government, but as he had to cope with the im-
plementation of such policies within the state, his views 
changed, and he became increasingly opposed to the 
Lincoln administration. 
The presidential election of 1864 also revealed Ken-
tucky's discontent with President Lincoln and his party. 
The central committee of the Union Democracy de-
cided to send delegates to the national Democratic con-
vention in Chicago instead of the Republican (or Union 
Party) convention in Baltimore. Robert J. Breckinridge 
then led a movement to build a party of "true Union 
men" to counter the claims of the Union Democrats. 
85 
The two groups were unable to reconcile their differen-
ces, and Breckinridge led his delegation to Baltimore, 
where he was honored by being elected temporary 
chairman of the Republican convention. Lincoln was 
renominated and, in a fateful move to demonstrate na-
tional strength, Unionist Andrew Johnson of Tennessee 
was selected for the vice presidency. 
The Union Democratic delegates to the Chicago con-
vention were instructed to support General McClellan 
for president and Governor Bramlette for his running-
mate. The convention condemned the proposed con-
gressional plan of reconstruction, the use of blacks as 
soldiers, and various alleged usurpations of power by 
the federal government. The old Southern Rights party 
of 1860, joined now by the Wickliffe followers, also sent 
delegates to Chicago under the banner of Peace Democ-
racy. This group favored a great national convention that 
would attempt to find ways to end the war and reunite 
the country. The Chicago convention seated both 
groups and gave each delegate half a vote. 
The August 1 state election for minor county officers 
and the Second District member of the Court of Appeals 
saw considerable interference by military authorities. 
Three days before the election General Burbridge or-
dered Judge Alvin Duvall's name kept off the poll-
books; the judge, who had served on the court since 
1856, fled the state to avoid probable arrest. Despite the 
scant time remaining, the Democrats nominated the 
highly respected George Robertson. At the last moment, 
too late for Burbridge to prevent his election, they tele-
graphed his name to the polling places. Although Rob-
ertson won, the voter turnout was only about a quarter 
of those eligible; many voters had apparently been in-
timidated into forgoing their right of suffrage. 
Governor Bramlette led the state's opposition to the 
highhanded methods employed by General Burbridge 
and other military leaders to secure Lincoln's election. 
"I am opposed to your election, and regard a change of 
86 
policy as essential to the salvation of our country," he 
informed the president, and protested, "We are dealt 
with as though Kentucky was a rebellious and con-
quered province, instead of being as they [sic] are, a 
brave and loyal people." There was little doubt about 
how Kentucky would vote, despite the efforts of the mil-
itary. McClellan lost nationally, but he carried the civil-
ian vote of the commonwealth over Lincoln, 61,478 to 
26,592, and he also won the separate soldiers' vote, 
3,068 to 1,205. Kentucky gave Lincoln his lowest vote 
(30.2 percent) among the twenty-five states participating 
in the election. Many Kentuckians obviously felt that 
Lincoln had abandoned the policy on which the war 
was being fought; as one newspaper put it, "He has 
fearfully imperiled the Union cause by his illegal aboli-
tion proclamations. . . ." 10 
No other general election was held in Kentucky be-
fore the end of the war, but in January 1865 the legisla-
ture elected a United States senator. The Radicals, as 
the Lincoln supporters were beginning to be called, 
nominated General Lovell H. Rousseau of Louisville, 
who had taken a strong stand against slavery. James 
Guthrie, his elderly conservative opponent, won by a 
surprisingly close vote of 65-56 that may have reflected 
both concern about Guthrie's age and the good reputa-
tion Rousseau enjoyed. The vote was certainly closer 
than the overall strength of the two state parties at that 
time. As Kentucky entered the postwar era, the conser-
vative Democrats were the dominant party; the return of 
Kentuckians who had been fighting in the Confederate 
armies would add to their strength. 
As a member of the Union, Kentucky was expected to 
supply men for the nation's army. During the early 
stages of the war, volunteers made up the state's quota 
of calls issued by the federal government. Minor crimi-
nals were allowed to enlist to escape punishment, and 
women of Unionist sympathies taunted men of military 
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age who stayed at home. But after the bloody campaigns 
of 1862 the number of volunteers failed to meet the in-
satiable demand of the army for more bodies. State 
bounties were not paid in Kentucky as they were in a 
number of other states, and Frankfort officials had in-
creased difficulty in supplying the numbers requested. 
The problem was, of course, shared by other states, and 
on March 3, 1863, Congress passed the first conscription 
act in the nation's history. 
There were cries of outrage in the state against the 
operation of the act; many of the protests came from 
those who were subject to the law. But the draft was 
also attacked as being un-American, degrading to Amer-
ican citizens, and an affront to their patriotism; some 
critics maintained that it was unconstitutional. Provi-
sions that allowed exemptions for supplying a substitute 
or paying a $300 commutation fee led to vehement pro-
tests that it was "a rich man's war and a poor man's 
fight." State authorities contended that Kentucky's 
quota was set too high, since it did not allow for the 
thousands of men who were in Confederate service, and 
they charged that the state had not been credited with 
all of its volunteers. Repeated efforts were made to se-
cure suspension of the act, but the federal government 
could not afford to give the state such a dispensation. 
In fact, relatively few Kentuckians were drafted, al-
though the act was an effective spur to "voluntary" en-
listments. The draft of March 1864 was fairly typical. 
Kentucky was asked to supply 9,186 men. Of that num-
ber, only 421 actually rendered personal service; 531 
others furnished substitutes; 3,241 paid the $300 com-
mutation charge; and 4,993 dodged the draft. The per-
centage of draftdodgers became even larger on later 
calls. Some men hid out in their own neighborhoods; 
others moved to states where they were not known, and 
a number fled to Canada or to Europe. Some joined 
guerrilla bands, and a considerable number decided 
that if they had to fight, they would prefer to be on the 
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Confederate side. In February 1865 a Union League of 
America official wrote that "every draft in Kentucky 
puts more men in the rebel than in the Union Army." 11 
But the need for troops continued, and the United 
States gradually turned to an untapped source of man-
power-the nation's blacks. Their use created intense 
excitement in Kentucky. Many Kentucky Unionists 
were slaveholders, and many more were convinced that 
the federal government had no right to interfere with 
slavery within a state. Early suggestions by such public 
figures as General Fremont and Secretary of War Cam-
eron that slaves should be freed and placed in military 
service elicited anger and dismay within the state. The 
legislature demanded the dismissal of Cameron from 
the cabinet, and General Anderson warned Lincoln that 
Fremont's proclamations were "producing most disas-
terous results in this State, and that it is the opinion of 
many of our wisest and soundest men that, if not imme-
diately disavowed and annulled Ky. will be lost to the 
Union." 12 Protests were redoubled when similar pro-
posals were advanced in the spring of 1863. No public 
official in Kentucky endorsed the idea, and most private 
citizens were bitter in their denunciation of the pro-
posal. Free Negroes were not citizens and they could 
not be used as soldiers, the editor of the Louisville 
Daily Courier declared on July 14, 1863. The order was 
simply illegal and would have to be withdrawn. 
As a first step that Kentuckians might accept, Lincoln 
suggested the enrollment of free Negroes, preliminary 
to their possible future enlistment. This proposal en-
countered violent opposition, although the number fi-
nally available for military service would probably have 
been well under 1,000. Even General Boyle, who had 
frequently been at odds with his fellow citizens, ob-
jected to the proposal. "You will revolutionize the 
State," he warned, "and do infinite and inconceivable 
harm . . . , and it will meet with decided opposi-
tion." 13 The opposition was indeed so great that action 
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was postponed until February 1864, when Provost Mar-
shall James B. Fry ordered the enrollment of all blacks 
of military age, including slaves. A hero of the Union 
campaigns in Kentucky then brought matters to a head. 
Colonel Wolford and his "wild riders" had carved an 
enviable record in clashes with Morgan and other Con-
federate raiders; it is doubtful if any other Federal regi-
ment in the state had participated in as many engage-
ments as the First Kentucky Cavalry. Wolford's loyalty 
and devotion had been unquestioned, but he could not 
accept the use of black soldiers. In public speeches in 
Lexington and Danville on March 10 he called for the 
use of force to prevent their enrollment. He advocated 
that enrolling officers should be tossed into the peniten-
tiary, and he pledged the support of his troops to block 
the policy of the federal government. Wolford was ar-
rested and sent to Tennessee for a trial, but his case was 
finally handled by a dishonorable dismissal from the 
army he had served so well. Governor Bramlette was as 
adamant as the colonel. On March 12 he informed the 
provost marshal in Boyle County, "if the president does 
not, upon my demand, stop the negro enrollment, I will. 
I am awaiting his answer." Kentucky faced the most 
serious internal crisis since the struggle over secession 
in 186l. 
But on March 15, after a series of mysterious confer-
ences involving such Unionists as Robert J. Breck-
inridge and General Burbridge, the governor issued a 
conciliatory proclamation calling upon the citizens to 
avoid "acts of violence" and "unlawful resistance." 
What had been called for was enrollment of the blacks, 
not actual enlistment, the governor explained, and pro-
tests should be made in a lawful manner. Breckinridge 
later said that Bramlette had prepared an earlier procla-
mation that called for armed resistance with Confeder-
ate aid; the governor denied that any such statement 
had ever been drafted.14 Prentice's Journal charged in 
the March 22 issue that the radicals wanted a confronta-
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tion between the state and the federal government so 
that Kentucky could be "declared in insurrection, her 
chosen authorities set aside as disloyal, her slaves pro-
claimed free, her constitution pronounced void, and the 
revolutionary work of framing a new constitution and of 
organizing a new government put exclusively in the 
hands of the radical faction. . . ." 
Bramlette led a protest delegation to Washington and 
extracted Lincoln's promise that blacks would not be 
enlisted in any county that met its quota through white 
enlistments. The blacks who were enlisted, the presi-
dent promised, would be trained out of state. But quotas 
were not met, and on April 18, 1864, General Burbridge 
began statewide black enlistments. Loyal slaveholders 
were to receive up to $300 for each slave lost to the 
army. Blacks volunteered quickly for a time; when the 
number dwindled, fugitive slaves were rounded up and 
pressed into service if their masters approved. Lieu-
tenant Governor R. T. Jacob and ex-Colonel Wolford, 
now commander of the state troops, led the opposition 
to the policy. Wolford was arrested in July for disloyalty 
and attempts to prevent enlistments, but he refused to 
halt his activities. After the November election both 
Jacob and Wolford were arrested. 
Release them, Bramlette demanded of Lincoln. "For 
if men of less prudence and patriotism were thus dealt 
with, having the power they possess, the consequences 
would be serious indeed. . . . Better send their ac-
cusers off; for they will not help us in the day of battle, 
and Jacob and Wolford will." 15 Lincoln pardoned the 
two offenders, but Jacob was nearly a month late arriv-
ing to preside over the Senate, and the arbitrary arrests 
further antagonized the public. Negro enlistments con-
tinued, however, and by April 1866, when the last of the 
blacks in the state were demobilized, some 29,000 had 
been enlisted, nearly 20,000 of them before the end of 
the war. 
The Confederacy had resorted to conscription a year 
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earlier than the Union, but for obvious reasons the Con-
federates were not able to set up draft machinery in 
Kentucky. In its last desperate moments the Confeder-
ate government authorized the use of black soldiers, but 
only a few companies were raised (in Virginia) and none 
saw active duty. 
The future of slavery also aroused intense interest in 
the state. While the 1860 Republican platform was ada-
mant about preventing the expansion of slavery, it did 
not call for abolition in states where slavery was legal. 
Despite his personal opposition to slavery, as the price 
of union Lincoln was willing to accept an amendment to 
the Constitution that would protect it in the states that 
elected to retain it. But as the war continued, Lincoln 
became convinced that the institution of slavery must 
be attacked, his justification being that it was an essen-
tial war measure. 
There had been unrest in Kentucky because certain 
antislavery army officers were reluctant to return fugi-
tive slaves to their masters. Further, the army's growing 
demand for slave labor-a demand that soon resembled 
a draft in many respects-kindled fear in the hearts of 
many slaveholders. Their concern deepened when Pres-
ident Lincoln suggested that the Border States demon-
strate their loyalty by freeing their slaves. On March 6, 
1862, he recommended that Congress provide compen-
sation to encourage the states to follow his suggestion. 
At $400 each, the president wrote the editor of the New 
York Times, the cost of only eighty-seven days of fight-
ing would free all the slaves in Kentucky, Delaware, 
Maryland, Missouri, and the District of Columbia. IS 
Kentucky officials indignantly spurned the proposal, 
and there is little doubt but that they accurately re-
flected majority opinion in the commonwealth. 
The Confederate retreat from the bloody ground at 
Antietam permitted Lincoln to issue his preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation without its appearing to be 
a desperate effort to gain additional support in the North 
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and abroad. While the proclamation applied only to 
those states or areas still in rebellion as of January 1, 
1863, Kentuckians were alarmed by the principles upon 
which it rested, and few citizens of the state endorsed it. 
W. F. Wickersham, for example, wrote from near Vicks-
burg, where he was serving in the Union army: "I don't 
believe that our army will hold together under the cir-
cumstances as Mr. Lincoln had made them for our army 
is not a going to fight to free the Negroes." Others as-
serted that if the proclamation had been issued a year 
earlier, Kentucky would have joined the Confederacy. If 
some slaves could be freed now, the rest could be freed 
at some future date. Governor Robinson denounced the 
proclamation in his January 1863 message to the legisla-
ture, and the legislators' main problem was to find the 
wording that would best express their disapproval. 
There was some wild talk of recalling all Kentuckians 
who were in the Union army, and a small vocal minority 
even advocated secession. The situation was so tense 
that Lincoln hesitated to supply arms for the Home 
Guard because the reactions of the state's leaders "ad-
monish me to consider whether any additional arms I 
may send there are not to be turned against the govern-
ment." 17 
Lincoln was anxious to get emancipation in his native 
state. If Kentucky would adopt a scheme of compen-
sated emancipation, it would solve the slavery problem 
in an important state and would encourage emancipa-
tion in the other loyal slave states. He urged such a pol-
icy upon a group of Kentucky Unionists who visited him 
in November 1862, and they promised to establish two 
emancipationist papers to counteract the influence of 
the Louisville newspapers.1S But the governor and the 
legislature scornfully rejected all such proposals. An act 
of March 2, 1863, forbade any Negro who claimed to 
have been freed by the Emancipation Proclamation to 
enter the state; violators were to be seized and treated 
as runaway slaves. As the war turned against the Con-
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federacy, the end of slavery became inevitable, and the 
price of slaves in Kentucky declined sharply. On Jan-
uary 31, 1865, Congress completed passage of the pro-
posed Thirteenth Amendment that would end slavery 
throughout the nation and sent it to the states for ratifi-
cation. Governor Bramlette recommended ratification, 
contingent upon Kentucky's receipt of $34,000,000, the 
assessed value of the state's slaves in 1864. But there 
was no chance of such conditions being met, and 
both houses rejected the amendment. When the Thir-
teenth Amendment became effective in December 
1865, Kentucky still clung defiantly to her discredited 
institution. Her stubbornness had forfeited any opportu-
nity for even partial compensation, and the loss of her 
slaves was perhaps the state's most serious economic 
setback of the war years. 
When freedom finally came, few of Kentucky's slaves 
had been prepared for their new status. Years later Will 
Oats recalled the mingled joy and apprehension with 
which his people received the news: "They were all 
very happy, but they were wondering what they were 
going to do without a home, work, or money." Many of 
the freedmen continued to work at least temporarily for 
their former masters. Mrs. Susan Dale Sanders had 
served in a household near Taylorsville. My mistress 
"told me I was free after the war was over," Mrs. 
Sanders said. "I got happy and sung but I didn't know 
for a long time, what to be free was, as after the war she 
hired me and I stayed on doin' all the cookin' and 
washin' and all the work, and I was hired to her for 
four dollars a month." 19 Their failure to anticipate the 
end of slavery and to prepare for it caused Kentuckians 
many problems during the postwar era. 
Civil War statistics are notoriously inaccurate, and it 
is impossible to ascertain with precision Kentucky's 
manpower contributions to the war. The total enlist-
ment of blacks and whites in Union service probably ex-
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ceeded 90,000; if the Home Guard is included, the 
number passed 100,000. Estimates of the number of 
Kentuckians in Confederate service range from 25,000 
to 40,000. With Union and Confederate enlistments 
combined, Kentucky's proportionate contribution of 
men was probably as great as that of any state on either 
side. Perhaps a third of the total died of battle wounds 
or disease during the war, and many others were crip-
pled for normal civilian life. A state census reported that 
in October 1864 Kentucky had 21,000 fewer white 
males over twenty-one years of age than had been in the 
state in 1861. 
Kentucky did not endure the physical destruction in-
flicted upon several other states, although a number of 
towns suffered considerable damage. But economic 
losses were certain when troops passed through a 
region, and the color of their uniforms made little dif-
ference. Fences were burned for firewood, fruit and 
roasting ears vanished, fodder and grain disappeared, 
hogs and chickens were never seen again, and horses 
and mules volunteered for military service. Unionist Jo-
seph Younglove complained to his brother James in 
April 1862, after the Confederates had evacuated Bowl-
ing Green, "We only got our cow about 10 days ago. 
Some of the Federal soldiers took her out of Tom Cal-
vert's stable and had been milking her until she was 
found." He had protested the disappearance of fence-
posts to the provost marshal: "I told him I thought it 
hard after the rebels had taken every thing but the posts 
that friends should take them. . . ." (The posts were 
returned.) Joseph said that his house and garden had 
experienced little harm while occupied by Confederate 
General Buckner, but Union soldiers had broken into 
his drugstore at least twenty times and done $1,000 
worth of damage. Fortunately, Aunt Minerva, a slave, 
had kept Yankee looters out of his house. Miles Kelly of 
the Bristow community in Warren County filed claims 
against the United States government for $17,755.80 for 
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supplies furnished Federal troops. They included 4,648 
bushels of corn, 6,070 bushels of oats, 80 tons of hay, 
and pasture for 550 horses for 70 days.20 
The state's Shaker communities at Pleasant Hill and 
South Union were famous for their fine crops and ex-
cellent livestock, and they were visited frequently by 
detachments from both armies. The South Union journal 
recounted frequent visits such as the one that occurred 
December 19, 1861. "The Southern Pickets rode up 
about seven o'clock at night and called for supper to be 
prepared for four hundred soldiers. We were to have it 
ready by eight o'clock.. . . After working hard and get-
ting the victuals cooked they did not arrive at the ap-
pointed time but came about midnight with five 
hundred cavalry all expecting supper." 21 South Union 
never recovered its prewar prosperity. 
Of course, payment was sometimes given for the 
property taken; in that case it was much better to be 
visited by Union than by Confederate soldiers. Confed-
erate money was difficult to dispose of under the best of 
circumstances, and its value declined drastically during 
the war. The demands of the Union army and the North-
ern civilian population were almost insatiable, and 
there was a market for almost anything that could be 
produced or manufactured in the state. Thus the drastic 
curtailment of the prewar Southern market did not dam-
age the state's economy as it would have under normal 
conditions. Kentucky was spared most of the desolation 
that blighted many parts of the Confederacy; she shared 
in much of the wartime prosperity that pervaded the 
North after an initial period of depression in 1861. The 
Northern wholesale farm price index of 100 in 1860 
slipped to 97 in 1861, then rose to 112 in 1862, 147 in 
1863, 210 in 1864, and fell to 192 in 1865 with the termi-
nation of the fighting. The general price index for the 
same years, starting at 100 in 1860, was 99, 111,135, 182, 
and 179.22 
The demands of the army and a decline in immigra-
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tion contributed to a shortage of labor that pushed up 
wages, but at a slower rate than the rise in prices. Thus 
while nonagricultural wages in the Union rose 43.1 per-
cent between 1860 and 1865, there was a decline in real 
purchasing power of approximately one-third. As usual 
in a period of inRation, people living on fixed incomes 
suffered most severely. Families of Union soldiers were 
often in dire straits, since privates received only $13 
per month during most of the war. The last pay raise of 
May 1, 1864, brought the amount only to $16, and pay-
ments frequently ran as much as six months in arrears. 
Confederate pay was only $11 per month until June 
1864, when it was increased to $18, but inRation had 
eroded most of its value by then. Kentucky dependents 
of Confederate soldiers could count on little or no finan-
cial assistance. Lieutenant Frank Tryon wrote his wife, 
Julia, from Murfreesboro about his concern for her eco-
nomic plight: "I fear that you may be in want and I 
know of no way to send you money. What we get here 
would be of no value with you and I can find no way of 
exchanging it." 23 
During the early months of the war, neutral Kentucky 
was a major conduit for the transportation of goods 
southward as the volume of trade suddenly ballooned. 
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad was the most im-
portant single avenue of shipment. While the line had 
been called completed before hostilities began, the 
claim was not altogether accurate. Much work, particu-
larly ballasting, remained to be done, and the available 
equipment was inadequate for the demands suddenly 
made upon it. When Fort Sumter was fired on, the line 
had only 30 locomotives, 28 passenger cars, and 297 
freight cars to service 269 miles of track. The problem 
was compounded by the uneven distribution of traffic; 
the great bulk of goods moved southward with largely 
empty cars hauled northward. Unionists both within 
and without the state objected to traffic with the enemy, 
and Cincinnati officials, always aware of the ir city's 
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trade rivalry with Louisville, made strenuous efforts to 
interdict the abnormal flow of traffic to Louisville. In-
diana and Illinois authorities also attempted to curtail 
the consignment of goods through Louisville unless the 
loyalty of the consignee could be established. 
Lincoln was reluctant to cut off the trade for fear hasty 
action might tip Kentucky's sympathies toward the Con-
federacy, but such free trade could not be tolerated in-
definitely after the war started. Secretary of the Trea-
sury Salmon P. Chase issued an order on May 2, 1861, 
directing the seizure of "arms, munitions of war, provi-
sions, or other supplies" whose ultimate destination was 
believed to be "any port or place under insurrectionary 
control," but the wording was so vague that it had little 
effect. The Cincinnati Gazette of June 15 editorialized 
bitterly, "The 'neutrality' of Kentucky seems to consist 
in perfect freedom to furnish our enemies the where-
with to make war upon us, and the Government know-
ingly permits this nefarious business to go on." 24 
The Union occupation of Cairo, Illinois, cut off a great 
deal of river traffic and exerted even more pressure on 
the overburdened L & N. Kentuckians protested loudly 
as the prohibitions became both more numerous and 
more effective, and ingenuity was taxed to its limits to 
discover subterfuges that could circumvent the growing 
maze of restrictions. After June 24 no shipments could 
be made from Louisville without a permit from the cus-
toms officer, but wagons hauled goods to towns to the 
south of the city from which they could be loaded with-
out interference. Border towns such as Franklin experi-
enced a sharp increase of imports, with the surplus soon 
crossing the Tennessee line. 
After Kentucky entered the war, the L & N suffered 
considerable damage and frequent disruption from Con-
federate raiders, as has been seen in earlier chapters. 
Strategic bridges and trestles had to be rebuilt time after 
time, and before the Confederates abandoned Bowling 
Green, they destroyed the important enginehouse and 
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machine shops as well as the railroad bridge across the 
Barren River. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1863, the railroad had its full line in use for only seven 
months and twelve days. But it was within the Union 
lines during most of the rest of the war, and the oc-
casional guerrilla raids did comparatively little damage 
when measured against the organized depredations ear-
lier in the war.25 
The early stages of the war also witnessed a large 
increase of river traffic on such streams as the Cum-
berland, Tennessee, and Green. Goods that reached Co-
lumbus could be shipped down the Mississippi to Con-
federate destinations with little danger of being 
intercepted. Some of the first effective efforts to halt the 
movement of goods came from Confederate, not Union, 
authorities. By acts of May 21 and August 2, the Confed-
erate Congress banned the exportation of cotton, to-
bacco, sugar, and other products through Kentucky and 
the other border states. The Union restrictions, while 
irksome, were not then nearly so stringent. The end of 
Kentucky's neutrality and the march southward of the 
Union armies altered the economic situation within the 
state. Restrictions were enforced more effectively than 
they had been previously, and some Kentuckians were 
soon complaining that they were treated as if they were 
Confederates. Permits were required for most goods and 
passengers, and such documents could be obtained only 
by staunch Unionists. Burbridge and other Federal 
officers later used similar permits to regulate trade 
within the state to the detriment of anyone suspected of 
Confederate inclinations. 
Among the obnoxious restrictions was one that pro-
hibited merchants in towns under 20,000 population 
from purchasing more than $3,000 worth of food sup-
plies each month or stocking more than a two-month 
supply. Governor Bramlette complained to the presi-
dent that "many loyal men are driven out of business 
. . . for no other reason than their political pre fer-
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ences," and in his January 1865 message to the legisla-
ture the governor denounced the permit system as "a 
most shameful and corrupt system of political partisan 
corruption and oppression." 26 Kentuckians were espe-
cially angered by the refusal of army officers to honor a 
January 8, 1864, pronouncement of the Treasury De-
partment that all trade restrictions in Kentucky had 
been rescinded. 
While all sections of the state were subject to some 
economic interference, the western counties that com-
prised the First Congressional District were hardest hit. 
Suspected, with considerable justification, of Confeder-
ate inclinations and isolated from the central portion of 
the state, the district's inhabitants were subjected to se-
vere restrictions from the onset of the war. The proscrip-
tions were most severe during the tenure of General 
E. A. Paine in the summer of 1864. Backed by Padu-
cah's Union League of America, Paine embarked on 
July 19 on what has been called "a fifty-one days' reign 
of violence, terror, rapine, extortion, and military mur-
der." 27 He even taxed the United States mail, until the 
arrival of an investigating committee forced him to flee 
into Illinois. The army later reprimanded the general for 
his misconduct, a "punishment" that infuriated his nu-
merous victims. 
The "Great Hog Swindle" of 1864 was the major eco-
nomic scandal of the war in Kentucky. It began in 
Louisville when Major Henry C. Symonds, depot com-
missary, declared that he could save money for the gov-
ernment by buying hogs directly from Kentucky farmers 
and packing the pork for the army without going 
through the usual contractors. Speculation in pork had 
driven prices so high that Symonds was given permis-
sion to proceed. Convinced that the pork speculators 
and packers had united against him, the major awarded 
bids illegally to businessmen who promised to cooper-
ate. To insure an adequate supply of animals, he se-
cured an order from General Burbridge prohibiting any 
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shipment of hogs out of state without a permit. A storm 
of protest greeted the scheme. Symonds and others 
were accused of "trying to enrich themselves at the ex-
pense of helpless Kentucky farmers." Under heavy pub-
lic pressure, Symonds gradually backed down, Bur-
bridge rescinded his out-of-state order on November 27, 
and the project was closed before the end of the year. 
Symonds insisted that he had saved at least $200,000 for 
the government; Governor Bramlette declared that Ken-
tucky farmers had been robbed of $300,000.28 
Louisville, which did not incur damage from Confed-
erate raids, after an initial slump prospered more from 
the war than any other Kentucky city. "Louisville is 
played out," one overly pessimistic businessman had 
moaned in the fall of 1861, " ... all trade is at a stand-
still. . . . Houses vacated by the dozens, streets looking 
every day in the week like Sunday, & mens faces like 
yardsticks are few of the troubles, staring every man in 
the face in this city." 29 His exaggerated description did 
not remain even partially true for long. With an 1860 
population of 69,729, Louisville was by far the com-
monwealth's largest city and most important trade cen-
ter. The Louisville and Nashville transportation artery 
was of great economic value, and the presence of sub-
stantial numbers of Union troops both taxed the re-
sources of the community and enhanced its profits. After 
the Mississippi River was opened by Union armies in 
1863, there was a sharp increase in river traffic, although 
some military restraints continued in effect until the 
end of the war. A joyous event was the arrival in Louis-
ville on Christmas Eve 1863 of a cargo of molasses and 
sugar from New Orleans; it was the first such cargo to 
dock in over two years. 
Farmland in the state decreased by 4,000,000 acres 
during the war, largely because of the scarcity of labor; 
but higher prices for nearly all produce brought un-
wonted prosperity to many farmers. By 1864 tobacco 
was selling for a dollar and a half to two dollars a pound, 
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and cotton grown in the state was bringing up to eighty 
cents a pound. Land was valued at $225,000,000 in 
1861; the total dropped to $174,000,000 the following 
year, with the probable loss of slaves and the general 
shortage of labor being at least partly responsible. But 
by 1865 the figure had climbed to $198,000,000 despite 
the imminent end of slavery. The decrease in livestock 
has sometimes been cited as an example of the farmers' 
economic losses. The 388,000 horses reported in 1861 
had dropped to 299,000 by October 1865; the number of 
mules declined from 95,000 to 58,000 during the same 
period; the 692,000 head of cattle diminished to 
520,000. But it might be more correct to attribute such 
declines to the unprecedented demand for animals that 
tempted breeders to sell at abnormally high prices a 
much larger than usual proportion of their stock. 
Few Kentuckians remained unaffected by the war, 
and the sharp divisions of opinion inevitably "left some 
permanent cracks in community solidarity that re-
mained a bitter legacy of the Civil War." A Union sol-
dier from Muhlenberg County swore that after the war 
he could not live with the Confederates near his home: 
"One or the other of us will have to leave the country 
forever." A visitor to Albany who watched a Unionist 
parade there in the summer of 1861 commented, "A 
Secessionist is not allowed to open his mouth." A Leb-
anon woman, who did not like Lincoln but could not 
stand the "traitorous rebels," told a friend that she did 
not go out much because of the bad feelings between 
secessionists and Unionists, and Harriet Means of Ash-
land remarked, "I would not dare to give a large party 
now for fear the ladies would all get into a free fight." In 
1862 Georgetown College even refused to graduate a 
young Mr. Black because he was "a violent seces-
sionist." 30 Some of the state's famous postwar feuds 
were based at least partly on wartime animosity. 
Congregations that had survived the strains and 
stresses of disagreement over slavery often split apart on 
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the issue of secession. Another religious consequence of 
the war and the end of slavery was the separation of 
black members from the congregations of which they 
had been a segregated part. Within a few years after the 
coming of peace, most blacks worshiped in their own 
churches. Concern was sometimes expressed for the ad-
verse effect that military service had upon the morals of 
some Kentucky soldiers. "Some that I thought would be 
good boys have gone Astray," one devout soldier com-
plained, "the Cards is used in place of the testament." 31 
The belated educational progress fostered by Robert 
J. Breckinridge during his 1847-1853 tenure as superin-
tendent of education was a wartime casualty. The con-
cept of public schools was not firmly established in Ken-
tucky minds, and little priority was given the 
educational system during the war. Teachers went into 
military service or found more profitable undertakings 
than teaching, and many undernourished schools 
quietly expired. Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Robert Richardson declared in his 1861 report that the 
war had "reduced the number of children in attendance 
on our public schools from 165,000 to about 90,000. An 
annual school fund, from all sources, of about $340,000 
has been reduced by it in a brief period to but little 
upwards of $200,000." By 1862 the situation was even 
worse. Some recovery was achieved in 1863, but a year 
after the war ended the educational statistics were just 
regaining prewar levels. Colleges were especially hard 
hit, since many of their students were of military age. 
Transylvania, only a few decades earlier one of the larg-
est and best colleges in the country, had its buildings 
converted into a military hospital. 
The Civil War inspired little creative activity of note 
within the state. The most influential writing was found 
in the state's partisan newspapers that did much to for-
mulate and express public opinion. Prentice, editor of 
the Louisville Daily Journal, was the most important 
editorial supporter of the Union cause. Yet his wife was 
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a secessionist, and both of their sons fought for the 
Confederacy. One can imagine the father's anguish 
when he announced in the October 2, 1862, issue that 
his son William had "perished in the cause of the rebel-
lion" from wounds received at Augusta, Kentucky. Pren-
tice never faltered in his opposition to the Confederacy, 
but he also opposed abolition, and he castigated Lincoln 
for his Emancipation Proclamation and other acts. Still, 
he was a solid bedrock of Unionist strength. 
Prentice's great rival during the neutrality era was 
Walter N. Haldeman, whose Louisville Courier was an 
outspoken advocate of the Confederate cause. Excluded 
from the mails and then suppressed when neutrality 
ended, the Courier was published in Bowling Green 
until the Confederate evacuation of that town forced it 
into a sporadic existence inside the Confederacy. It is 
ironic that in 1868 the Courier and the Journal com-
bined to form one paper. Less outspoken than Hal-
deman, John H. Harney, editor of the Louisville Demo-
crat, became the voice of the Peace Democrats; he grew 
increasingly critical of Lincoln and his policies. The 
Frankfort Commonwealth was a consistent supporter of 
the Unionist cause; the Kentucky Yeoman, which had 
supported secession, modified its views sufficiently that 
it avoided suppression. A number of small newspapers 
were victims of wartime shortages and high prices or 
were suppressed by the army. 
The Civil War created an aura of excitement and sus-
pense, and Kentuckians sought relief from the tensions 
of the war in numerous social activities. Whenever mili-
tary conditions permitted, the presence of troops led to 
feverish rounds of dances, parties, band concerts, pic-
nics, flirtations, and, occasionally, weddings. Of course, 
such activities were usually boycotted by those of op-
posing political views. Federal troops were taken some-
what for granted, but the entrance of a Confederate de-
tachment into a town with Confederate sympathies 
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provoked a frenzied celebration before the raiders had 
to move on. It was a singing war, and soldiers and civil-
ians of all parties wept through lachrymose renditions of 
"Lorena," "All Quiet Along the Potomac Tonight," 
"J ust Before the Battle, Mother," and "Juanita," while 
"Dixie" and "The Bonnie Blue Flag" or "John Brown's 
Body" and "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" be-
trayed political affiliations. All Kentuckians claimed 
"My Old Kentucky Home." 
If troops remained in an area for an extended period, 
social activities became better organized and assumed a 
formal complexion. Bowling Green was the center of 
Confederate social life during the few months that it 
was the capital. A local girl was delighted to receive a 
formal invitation: "The officers of Wirt Adams' Cavalry 
will be glad to see Miss at a collation at their 
camp at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon to meet Mrs. 
Wirt Adams." As a public display of their martial skills, 
officers often staged dress parades, drills, and sham bat-
tles. One sham attack at Bowling Green nearly turned 
into tragedy when a mistaken order sent 1,200 cavalry-
men in a wild charge toward the civilians who were 
watching the proceedings. Agatha Strange of Bowling 
Green recalled later: "Our house in those days was 
visited and made the home of by the intellect and chiv-
alry of the South. . . . These were days of happiness 
and never can be erased from my memory." 32 
Lieutenant William P. Davis, an engaging young 
scamp, was one of many soldiers who sampled Ken-
tucky's hospitality during the war. When the Fourteenth 
Mississippi Infantry entered Hopkinsville on October 1, 
1861, Davis capitalized on the warm welcome that 
greeted the Confederates. "The streets were crowded 
with ladies, secession flags flying, ladies hunting sick to 
take care of them," he wrote in his diary. "As I felt very 
bad and wanted something nice to eat, Charles Williams 
of Comp K and Segt. Burk and myself concluded we 
would make a bold start so we asked a negro where 
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some nice young ladies [were] and he carried us to 
Mr. Dillards where we found three beautiful young la-
dies. Introducing ourselves as Miss. soldiers, we were 
invited to take seats and they discoursed some nice 
music for us and prepared fine supper though I must 
confess I felt a little bad setting down to agent's table 
with ladies for neither of us had changed clothes for 7 
days. . . ." A few weeks later Davis and two enlisted 
friends sought companionship in Bowiing Green, where 
they "found quite a number of ladies at the baptist 
church preparing to give a tableaux for the benefit of 
sick soldiers. The ladies asked me to take a part but I 
excused my self though formed the acquaintance of 
Miss Dearing, enjoying my self very much and saw Miss 
Dearing home." Lieutenant Davis at least partly repaid 
his social obligations to the commonwealth by taking 
the regimental band into town to give a concert.33 
Memories of the Civil War have never been erased 
from the minds of Kentuckians, and for those who lived 
in that era "the War" was one of the momentous experi-
ences of their lives. They were never quite the same af-
terwards. Nor was Kentucky ever again quite the same. 
It is a cliche to say that wars never solve anything; like 
many cliches, it is not entirely true. Kentuckians who 
lived into the postwar era discovered that several ques-
tions had been settled by that conflict. Limits were set 
to the doctrine of states' rights; no state has attempted 
secession since 1861. Slavery was ended in 1865, al-
though a majority of the state's citizens deplored the act. 
And the heritage of the war and the bitterness engen-
dered during the Reconstruction era led the state into 
the Southern Democratic ranks for years to come. It has 
been said with considerable truth that Kentucky joined 
the Confederacy after the war was over. 
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A Note to Readers 
SOURCES on the Civil War in Kentucky are both volu-
minous and scattered, with libraries and repositories 
across the country containing collections and occasional 
items. The footnotes indicate only a few of the sources 
consulted in the preparation of the manuscript. 
One wishing to read on the topic would do well to 
start with J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil 
War and Reconstruction, 2d ed. (Boston, 1961), for an 
excellent overview of the period and a fine bibliogra-
phy. For the Kentucky background, Thomas D. Clark, A 
History of Kentucky (Lexington, 1960), is the best start-
ing point, although a number of the older state histories 
are also helpful. Lewis and Richard H. Collins, History 
of Kentucky (Covington, 1874), 2 vols., contains a great 
deal of information in the form of undigested annals. 
Bell 1. Wiley in The Life Of Johnny Reb (Indianapolis, 
Ind., 1943), and The Life of Billy Yank (Indianapolis, 
Ind., 1951), has presented the classic description of 
the life of the common soldier during the Civil War. 
The best survey of slavery in the state is J. Winston 
Coleman, Jr., Slavery Times in Kentucky (Chapel Hill., 
N.C., 1940). 
Despite its age, E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and 
Readjustment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1926; re-
print ed., Gloucester, Mass., 1966), remains the best 
book on the subject. Especially strong on political and 
economic developments, it is less complete on the mili-
tary aspects of the war. The Army of Tennessee had a 
vital role in determining the course of the war in Ken-
tucky; the best study of its campaigns and leaders is 
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Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland 
(Baton Rouge, La., 1967) and Autumn of Glory (Baton 
Rouge, La., 1971), although Stanley F. Horn, The Army 
of Tennessee (Indianapolis, Ind., 1941), is still useful. 
Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate De-
feat: Field Command (New York, 1969), is a fine analy-
sis of an unsuccessful commander. Since each is 
strongly biased, one should balance J. Stoddard John-
ston, Kentucky, vol. 9 of Clement A. Evans, ed., Confed-
erate Military History (Atlanta, Ga., 1899) and Thomas 
Speed, The Union Cause in Kentucky, 1860-1865 (New 
York, 1907), against each other. 
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Of-
ficial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 
128 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1880-1901) is an incompa-
rable collection of primary sources-battle reports, let-
ters, telegrams-for both armies; some 30 volumes con-
tain material relating to the war in Kentucky. The naval 
records, including those for the river gunboats, are in 
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 30 vols. (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1894-1922). Robert Underwood John-
son and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (New York, 1887-88) 
contains a number of articles on the war in Kentucky 
written by Union and Confederate participants. Perhaps 
the most interesting personal account by a Kentuckian is 
Basil W. Duke, A History of Morgan's Cavalry (1867; 
reprint ed., Bloomington, Ind., 1960). Anyone who 
hopes to understand what the war meant to the soldiers 
and civilians of that era should read some of the contem-
porary newspapers and dip into the manuscript collec-
tions at such repositories as the libraries of The Filson 
Club, the State Historical Society, the University of 
Kentucky and Western Kentucky University. 
Minor but nagging questions are often encountered in 
Civil War reading; many of them can be answered 
quickly by consulting Mark M. Boatner III, The Civil 
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War Dictionary (New York, 1959). E. B. Long has pro-
vided a useful chronology in The Civil War Day by Day 
(New York, 1971), and each Civil War general is dis-
cussed briefly in Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray 
(Baton Rouge, 1959), and Generals in Blue (Baton 
Rouge, 1964). 
Much of the writing on the Civil War in Kentucky has 
appeared in articles in magazines and historical jour-
nals. The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 
(1903- ), and The Filson Club History Quarterly 
(192&-- ), contain dozens of such articles, including 
many edited diaries and collections of letters. Many 
other magazines and journals also have articles touch-
ing upon the Civil War in Kentucky. 
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